Insurance Claims and Bad Faith Law Blog

Liability Insurers Initiating Settlement Negotiations: Ever a Legal Duty?

  

   This is the last in a continuing series of posts begun on Monday, November 30, 2009 and continued on Wednesday, December 2, 2009 , Thursday, December 3, 2009, Monday, December 7, 2009, Monday, December 14, 2009, and on Wednesday, December 16, 2009, which are intended to address this important issue:

Whether there is ever a duty on a Liability Insurer to make a settlement offer, and if so, when.

The answer depends upon some background.  What follows is an analysis of research compiled by Dennis J. Wall and published online and in print, in "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith" (Second Edition Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 2009 Supplement West Publishing Company), particularly Section 3:13.

Asterisks (***) indicate omitted material.

In the recent case of Barry v. GEICO General Ins. Co., 938 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), this burden was met with evidence that included this testimony of a lawyer as an Expert Witness:

GEICO presented the testimony of ... a lawyer-expert in insurance bad faith, who opined that GEICO did not act in bad faith. He testified that although GEICO immediately attempted settlement and Stone[, 'the assigned claims adjuster,'] had tried to work with [the widow of the deceased victim,] Capelli, her refusal to communicate with Stone made it clear that she was not intending

to settle.... [The lawyer-expert] further stated that the actions of Capelli and her attorney were inconsistent with a willingness to settle. These included Capelli's failure to speak to the insurance company and her attorney's failure to notify the insurance company that he represented Capelli, which indicated to him that this was not a claim which could have been settled.

Id.  at 615-16.  The result was a jury verdict for the insurance company on the claim of Bad Faith failure to settle.  Id. at 616.  The Florida appellate court explained its affirmance of the Judgment entered by the Trial Court upon the jury verdict:

Although [the policyholder] Barry is correct that the focus of an insurance bad faith case is not on the motive of the claimant but of the insurer in fulfilling its duty to its insured, Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 2004), that does not mean that all inquiries into prior conduct and motives are irrelevant and prejudicial. In a bad faith case, the insurer has the burden to show that there was no realistic possibility of settlement within the policy limits. See Powell [v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 584 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), review denied, 598 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1992)]. This question is decided based upon the totality of the circumstances. See Berges. The conduct of Capelli and her attorney would be relevant to the question of whether there was any realistic possibility of settlement. Despite Capelli's testimony at trial that she would have settled the case if GEICO had not made the mistake, her actions and those of her attorney suggested otherwise. The jury could have concluded that the failure of her attorney to notify GEICO of his representation coupled with her refusal to meet with Stone on the settlement, among other incidents, showed that she did not want to settle with GEICO for the policy limits. Thus, GEICO did not inject irrelevant information into the case, and therefore we reject Barry's argument as to the cumulative nature of the errors.

Id. at 618.

From Dennis J. Wall, "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith," published by West, a Thomson Reuters business, and UPDATED.

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Liability Insurer Duty to Initiate Settlement? If So, When?

   This is one in a continuing series of posts begun on Monday, November 30, 2009 and continued on Wednesday, December 2, 2009 , Thursday, December 3, 2009, Monday, December 7, 2009, and on Monday, December 14, 2009, which are intended to address this important issue:

Whether there is ever a duty on a Liability Insurer to make a settlement offer, and if so, when.

The answer depends upon some background.  What follows is an analysis of research compiled by Dennis J. Wall and published online and in print, in "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith" (Second Edition Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 2009 Supplement West Publishing Company), particularly Section 3:13.

   The burden of proof belongs to the liability insurance company in such a case to show that realistically the injured claimant would not have accepted the settlement offer:

Any doubt as to the existence of an opportunity to settle within the face amount of the coverage or as to the ability and willingness of the insured to pay any excess required for settlement must be resolved in favor of the insured unless the insurer, by some affirmative evidence, demonstrates that there was not only no realistic possibility of settlement within policy limits, but also that the insured would not have contributed to whatever settlement figure above that sum might have been available.

Rova Farms, 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495, 507 (1974). Accord, Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), review denied, 598 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1992). "Florida law, however, ... treats the unwillingness of a victim to settle as a defense which the insurer must prove." Snowden v. LumbermensMut. Cas. Co., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128 (N.D. Fla. 2003). The Federal Court in this case added this explanation of the reason behind this rule of Florida law:

The recognition of the speculative nature of this kind of testimony is the reason why Florida courts have focused not on the mindset of the injured party but on the conduct of the insurer under the circumstances. That is, rather than trying to conjure the secret intent of the injured party, courts simply ask whether under all the circumstances known to the insurer[,] would reasonable diligence and ordinary care dictate an offer to settle within policy limits. The victim's unwillingness to settle, however, is not completely ignored under Florida law. The unwillingness to settle will become a factor only in the unlikely case where the insurer is able to conclusively prove the unwillingness to settle for the policy limits.

 

Id. at 1129.

 

From Dennis J. Wall, "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith," published by West, a Thomson Reuters business, and UPDATED.

TO BE CONTINUED.  Please Read The Disclaimer.

Tax on BONUSES Proposed (Update 3).

   Two days after the original post here of Tuesday, December 8, 2009 explored a proposal for a Tax on BONUSES paid to people employed by Wall Street businesses, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of France published an op-ed piece together in the Wall Street Journal.  A one-time Tax on BONUSES was only one of the options they recommended.  That was clearly stated.

   The two leaders wrote much more about the need for a huge change in the way that salaries and bonuses and other payments are made to people like those paid by Wall Street Banks, on the one hand, and the rest of us on the other hand.  Prime Minister Brown and President Sarkozy  concentrated in particular on perceptions of equity that would be the results of a system with inherently greater equality.  In other words, greater built-in Good Faith and Fair Dealing.  See Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy, Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, Thursday, December 10, 2009.  (Unfortunately, as often happens, the op-ed piece cannot be found online at wsj.com, even if you are willing to pay the charges that the WSJ regularly imposes.  However, if the print edition is available to you then so is this interesting op-ed column.)

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Does a Liability Insurer Have a Duty to Initiate Settlement?

      This is one in a continuing series of posts begun on Monday, November 30, 2009 and continued on Wednesday, December 2, 2009 , Thursday, December 3, 2009, and on Monday, December 7, 2009, which are intended to address this important issue:

Whether there is ever a duty on a Liability Insurer to make a settlement offer, and if so, when.

The answer depends upon some background.  What follows is an analysis of research compiled by Dennis J. Wall and published online and in print, in "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith" (Second Edition Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 2009 Supplement West Publishing Company), particularly Section 3:13.

Asterisks (***) indicate omitted material.

   A Florida intermediate appellate court has explained the view that in at least some situations, a Liability Insurer may have a duty as a matter of law to "initiate settlement negotiations":  "Where liability is clear, and injuries so serious that a judgment in excess of the policy limits is likely, an insurer has an affirmative duty to initiate settlement negotiations."  Powell v Prudential Prop & Casualty Ins Co, 584 So 2d 12, 14 (Fla Dist Ct App 1991), review denied, 598 So 2d 77 (Fla 1992). This rule of Florida law may have first been pronounced by a Federal Court, twenty years before Powell was decided.  See Self v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 191, 197 (M.D. Fla. 1972).*** Under the facts of this case, the Federal Court also held that Allstate acted in Bad Faith because it did not even make a settlement offer in any amount: "This Court has concluded that Allstate is guilty of bad faith in failing to explore the possibility of settling and in failing to make at least a minimum offer of settlement." Id. [Emphasis added.]

   To like effect as the Powell decision, where the injured plaintiff does not make a settlement demand within the insured's policy limits:

  The better view is that the insurer has an affirmative duty to explore settlement possibilities.... At most, the absence of a formal request to settle within the policy is merely one factor to be considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, on the issue of good faith.

Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495, 505 (1974).

 

From Dennis J. Wall, "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith," published by West, a Thomson Reuters business, and UPDATED.

TO BE CONTINUED.  Please Read The Disclaimer.

Tax on BONUS Proposed (Update 2).

   This is an Update to posts in this space on Tuesday, December 8, 2009 and on the morning of Thursday, December 10, 2009.

   France is following the lead of Great Britain.  France, too, will impose a 50% "one-off," or one-time, tax on Bonuses above a certain amount that are paid by banks operating in that country.  Ben Hall, "France to Impose Tax on Bank Bonuses" (Financial Times Online at FT.com, Thursday, December 10, 2009).

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Gold Sacks Offerings, Efforts at Shareholders Favoring Bonus Gold.

  Prompt repayment of TARP Funds may be in the best interests of Shareholders; hasty repayment probably is not.  An incentive inherent in the repayment of TARP Funds "is being able to stop making dividend payments to the government."  See Jim Puzzanghera and Walter Hamilton, "Bank Bailouts Appear to be Paying Off" (Los Angeles Times Online, Friday, December 4, 2009).  At a prevailing rate of 5% to 8% depending on whether the TARP Funds were received in the first or second wave, see id., getting out from under paying dividends to the Federal Government would seem to be in the best interests of Shareholders when the Officers and Directors of the Corporation can make more than 5% to 8% with the money that would go to pay such dividends.

  Similarly, making major Bonus payments in huge amounts may or may not be in the best interests of Shareholders.  Goldman Sachs was recently moving hard to convince Shareholders that making major Bonus payments is in their best interest.  See Susanne Craig, "Goldman Seizes the Offensive on Pay" p. C1, col. 1 (Wall Street Journal, "Money & Investing" Section, Thursday, December 3, 2009), subscription required to read the entire article online.  Parenthetically, more recently Goldman Sachs announced that it would make Bonus Payments only in stock, not in cash. Jenny Anderson, "Goldman Sachs Alters its Bonus Policy to Quell Uproar" (New York Times Online, Friday, December 11, 2009).

   Nonetheless, if the effect of making Bonus Payments in any form has the effect of diluting the value of Shares, one has to wonder how that could possibly be in the best interests of the people holding those Shares.  Cf. Andrew Ross Sorkin, "Dealbook/Bailout Refund is All About Pay, Pay, Pay" p. B1, col. 1 (New York Times Nat'l ed., "Business Day" Section, Tuesday, December 8, 2009):  "Bank of America was so desperate, in fact, that it diluted its own shareholders by selling new shares worth $18.8 billion to replace some of the funds it is returning." 

   At the same time, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner gave an interview to Albert Hunt on Mr. Hunt's Bloomberg television show, "Political Capital," questioning the payment of Goldman Sachs huge bonuses at all.  See Rich Miller and Christine Harper, "Geithner Disputes Goldman Sachs Claims It Didn't Need U.S. Help" (Bloomberg.com, Saturday, December 5, 2009).  As the title of the linked news report suggests, Mr. Geithner also contradicted Goldman's oft-repeated (ad nauseam?) argument that Goldman received nothing from the Bailout which it could not have engineered all by itself -- presumably including the elimination of its longstanding rival, Lehman Brothers.

   Here is a clip from the interview made available on Bloomberg.com.

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Windfall BONUS Tax Proposal: UPDATE.

   This is an Update to the post in this space on Tuesday, December 8, 2009.

  Since the post here on Tuesday, December 8, 2009 regarding a Windfall BONUS Tax Proposal, magic is in the air, as they say.  On Wednesday, December 9, 2009 action was proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives for what was reported as authority for "a 60 percent excise tax [to] be imposed on employees awarded bonuses by banks that received taxpayer support."  Landon Thomas, Jr., "Britain Sets Tax on Bank Bonuses" p. A1, col. 1 (New York Times Nat'l ed., Thursday, December 10, 2009).

   In Great Britain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or treasury secretary, the Honorable Alistair Darling, announced a new tax on BONUSES on Wednesday, December 9, 2009.  The tax would be paid by banks and employees would also be taxed at previous rates on their incomes.

   Employers, i.e., the banks subject to the new tax in the U.K., would not be allowed to take a tax deduction for at least the portion of their bonus payments subject to the new tax.

   Further, the new U.K. tax applies to all banks doing business in the United Kingdom.  That includes banks viewed as operating predominantly from the United States, but with offices in the U.K., such as Citigroup, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs.    E.g., Brooke Masters, "The Case For and Against the Bank Levy" (Financial Times at FT.com, Wednesday, December 9, 2009); Deborah Solomon, Sara Schaefer Munoz and Alistair MacDonald, "Firms Face New Curbs on Pay" p. A1, col. 3 (Wall Street Journal, Thursday, December 10, 2009); Landon Thomas, Jr., New York Times, supra.

   As reported from Great Britain by Anthony Faiola under the original headline, "Britain Hits Bankers With One-Time Levy on Bonuses," on Wednesday, December 9, 2009, republished under a new headline on Thursday, December 10, 2009 at Washington Post.com:

   With public anger growing here, as in the United States, over plans by financial institutions to dole out billions in executive bonus so soon after the crisis, Darling also unveiled a much-anticipated one-time tax on bank bonuses over $42,000 -- generating a pool of $924 million to be spent on job creation.

   "There are some banks who still believe their priority is to pay substantial bonuses to their already high-paid staff," Darling told Parliament.  "So I am giving them a choice.  They can use their profits to build up their capital base.  But if they insist on paying substantial rewards, I am determined to claw money back for the taxpayer."

   Bankers in Britain are said to be furious, for some reason.  See Patrick Jenkins and Brooke Masters, "Bankers Fury at UK Bonus Supertax" (Financial Times at FT.com, Wednesday, December 9, 2009); Patrick Jenkins, Banking Editor, "'What Banker Wants to be in the UK?'" (Financial Times at FT.com, Wednesday, December 9, 2009).

   Momentum is growing toward nothing less than making more just the publicly supported structure of wealth distribution.  These efforts have force and majesty behind them.  Indeed the momentum is already here.

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Windfall BONUS Tax Proposed.

  All efforts at putting together a tax to recoup and to manage the tons of money that Wall Street firms are now raking in, after they were left for dead in the Panic of 2008-2009, are focused on only one thing it seems:  Profits.  For example, see Prof. Steven M. Davidoff's post on his blog, "The Deal Professor," entitled "A Windfall Profits Tax for Goldman Sachs?" (Post on New York Times Web Site, Friday, December 4, 2009).  The linked post is long, comprehensive, and, well, it was written by a professor.

   It may take awhile to wade through the linked post.  At the end, it seems that much of the windfall profits will remain in the treasuries of Goldman Sachs and other Wall Street firms, rather than any large part of them being recouped by the United States Treasury. 

   What these proposals seem to ignore, as well-thought-out and as well-written as Professor Davidoff's is for example, is that the treasuries of the Wall Street firms will largely be paid out to the firms' employees, often regardless of those firms' profit-and-loss results.  So long as they have money, those firms will pay it out to employees, often if not always at the expense of shareholders.

   Putting Fiduciary Responsibility issues aside for the moment, these payments reflect an abuse of the existing tax system and of the Taxpayers.  However, for any tax system to recoup any part of these ill-conceived payments, some factors of fairness and equity should be built in.

   These concerns include treating all persons subject to the new tax to the same basic equality of treatment.  One person should not be treated differently from another except on some reasonable basis that makes them different, in terms of whether they should be subject to this tax.

   Reasonable equality of treatment will insure that all persons subject to the tax are treated more or less equally, and that "too big to fail" firms will not attract more and brighter employees than so-called small firms as a result of this tax.

   The economic justification for this tax is clear:  Most people cannot afford to finance the extravagant lives led by a few.  Simple.  The U.S. needs the money.

   Fundamental fairness is an even more compelling justification for this tax.  The few who benefit by the Wall Street Windfalls should bear the burden of being handsomely compensated as a result of those Windfalls, not the average Taxpayer. 

   Asking the average Taxpayer to pay for other people's benefits is socialism, and many people are afraid of and angry about socialism in the United States, it seems.

   In the end, a new tax on Windfall BONUSES might address all these concerns, and then some.  People subject to the tax would by definition pay a greater part of the freight for every Wall Street Windfall.  A "windfall" will be pegged to the Firm's profit-and-loss results.  If there is a "windfall" when measured against the chosen metric for a BONUS, such for example as when a year's results of loss and income meet or exceed a given percentage of the Employing Firm's expenses in excess of its income,  then the employee receiving a BONUS under those circumstances should pay an additional percentage of it back to the public Treasury in that event.

   This new taxation system would be fairer and more equitable than the system in place now.  Further, it would be perceived, rightly, as fairer and more equitable.  It would tend to insure domestic tranquility, and redirect lives in paths of production for society as a whole rather than for individual excess.

   Insurance.  In the best meaning of that word.

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Duty of Liability Insurance Company to Initiate Settlement? Ever? When?

  

     What do the Cases Say? 

   This is one in a continuing series of posts begun on Monday, November 30, 2009 and continued on Wednesday, December 2, 2009 and on Thursday, December 3, 2009, which are intended to address this important issue:  Whether there is ever a duty on a Liability Insurer to make a settlement offer, and if so, when.  The answer depends upon some background.  What follows is an analysis of research compiled by Dennis J. Wall and published online and in print, in "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith" (Second Edition Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 2009 Supplement West Publishing Company), particularly Section 3:13.

 

To summarize the holdings of case law for the past twenty to thirty years, the following view has gained increasing numbers of judicial supporters:  The absence of a third party's settlement demand will not insulate a liability insurer from exposure to extracontractual liability, i.e., liability to pay sums beyond its policy limits, as a result of its bad faith and unfair dealing in settlement which can include a failure to initiate settlement negotiations even in the absence of a demand from the injured third party, at least where liability of the insured is clear and damages are great.

 

   That is still the modern view. More than that, it is hard to find any contrary proponent in any judicial decision available today. If not the unanimous view for a very long time, such is the decided majority view and has been the majority view in United States jurisdictions for decades.[FN113.50]To put it another way, as a Federal District Court recently has done, "the duty to accept reasonable settlement offers within policy limits when faced with the significant likelihood of an excess judgment (and potential punitive damage liability for the insured)" is an extension of the duty to defend.[FN113.60]

 

[FN113.50]E.g., Badillo v. Mid Century Insurance Co., 2005 OK 48 ¶¶33-34, 121 P.3d 1080, 1095 ¶¶33-34 (2005)("[A] legally binding, unconditional offer of settlement from the claimant is not a prerequisite to maintaining an action of this type where the insured has been exposed to an excess verdict.... In the circumstances here, insurers could be found to have had an affirmative duty to seize a reasonable opportunity to protect insured from the potential for excess liability and their duty consisted of more than merely playing a passive role in the settlement process."); State Automobile Insurance Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 432, 427 S.W.2d 30, 34 (1968)("We are asked to hold as a matter of law that an insurance company cannot be held liable for bad faith for failing to settle a case when there is no demand for settlement for an amount of money which is within the limits of coverage afforded by the policy of insurance. We are of the opinion that such is not the law nor should it be."); Alt v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 342, 237 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1976)("We conclude that the trial court erred in holding that a legally binding offer by the claimant is a prerequisite to maintaining an action for bad faith where an insured has been exposed to excess liability.").

[FN113.60]Rupp v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1324, 2008 WL 4951071 *17 (D. Utah, Nov. 17, 2008)(case involved Utah substantive law).

  

 From Dennis J. Wall, "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith," published by West, a Thomson Reuters business, and UPDATED.

TO BE CONTINUED.  Please Read The Disclaimer.

Do Liability Insurers Have a Duty to Offer a Settlement?

      What do the Cases Say? 

   This is one in a continuing series of posts begun on Monday, November 30, 2009 and continued on Wednesday, December 2, 2009, which are intended to address this important issue:  Whether there is ever a duty on a Liability Insurer to make a settlement offer, and if so, when.  The answer depends upon some background.  What follows is an analysis of research compiled by Dennis J. Wall and published online and in print, in "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith" (Second Edition Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 2009 Supplement West Publishing Company), particularly Section 3:13.

Further, many courts, taking what is clearly the modern view, have held that a liability insurer has an affirmative duty to undertake settlement negotiations when:

 

1. The probability of liability is high;

 

2. Likely damages are great; or

 

3. The insured has an excess liability policy.

 

See Dennis J. Wall, Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith § 3:11 (Second Edition; 2009 Supplement West Publishing Company).

 

  Also, if there are other financial holdings which could be exposed before or after the entry of an excess judgment, regardless of whether there has been any demand by the injured third party, the insurer must undertake settlement negotiations.[FN113]

 

Kansas law imposes such a duty, it has been held:

Kansas imposes, under certain circumstances, a duty upon an insurer to initiate settlement negotiations even without an offer to settle being made by the claimant. Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532, 537 (10th Cir. 1976). Rather than this duty hinging on the existence of a claimant's settlement offer, a Kansas insurer's "duty to settle arises if the carrier would initiate settlement negotiations on its own behalf were its potential liability equal to that of its insured." Id.[FN113.10]

This duty arises where the liability insurance company would "initiate settlement negotiations" for itself it its own exposure to potential liability was the same as that of its insureds. It is the existence of a claim for damages in excess of policy limits that activates this duty, which is a fiduciary duty, the Roberts court held under Kansas law, and not the existence of an injured claimant's offer or demand in excess of policy limits. [FN113.20]Moreover, Kansas law requires a claim, not a lawsuit, for damages in excess of policy limits.[FN113.30]

 

   To summarize a canvass of the case law existing on these issues more than two decades ago, the modern view then was that the absence of a third party's settlement demand will not insulate a liability insurer from exposure to liability to pay sums beyond its policy limits as a result of its bad faith and unfair dealing in settlement. [FN113.40]

 

Asterisks (***) indicate omitted material.

 

[FN113]*** E.g., Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 173 Or. App. 633, 638, 22 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2001), review denied, 332 Or. 631, 34 P.3d 1178 (2001); see City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 576, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1998)(case of first impression, apparently, under New Mexico law).***

 

   In Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 22, 545 P.2d 979, 984 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1, Dep't B, 1976), the Arizona Court of Appeals wrote a comprehensive treatise on Arizona law on this issue, concluding in pertinent part:

 

We therefore hold, in the absence of a demand or request to settle within policy limits or within the limits of the insured's financial ability, plus policy limits, that a conflict of interest would give rise to a duty on behalf of the insurer to give equal consideration to the interest of 

its insured where there is a high potential of claimant recovery and a high probability that such a recovery will exceed policy limits.  It is important to remember that this holding only goes to the issues of when the duty to give equal consideration arises, not what factors, including failure to initiate settlement, would give rise to a breach of that duty.

 [Emphasis added.]

[FN113.10] Roberts v. Printup, 422 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2005).

[FN113.20] Id. at 1215-16.

[FN113.30] Id. at 1216. In the Roberts case, the Tenth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for the insurance company, and remanded for further consideration of, among other things, an alleged claim that the liability insurer acted "negligently and/or in bad faith" by allegedly "failing to initiate negotiations for settlement when it was [allegedly] apparent that liability was reasonably clear and damages were in excess of policy limits." Id. at 1220.

[FN113.40] See § 3:11, supra.

 From Dennis J. Wall, "Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith," published by West, a Thomson Reuters business.

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