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What you are about to read is the result of a forensic investigation into the electronic Court Files of a class action settlement. A Federal Court approved it and its Order and Final Judgment are now on appeal. Even before the Order and Judgment, the very fact of settlement negotiations without more has caused Courts to stay other class actions and to put the burden of proof on plaintiffs that their cases are not precluded by the class action settlement.
They were against it before they were for it.
The defendants in a Federal class action case in Florida, Fladell, et al., Plaintiffs v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., Defendants (S.D. Fla. Case No. 13-cv-60721), argued against class certification of the lender force-placed insurance (“LFPI”) claims alleged against them and against certification of any of the classes urged by the plaintiffs in that case. Two months later the defendants settled the Fladell case and urged the Federal Judge presiding over that case to approve more claims and more classes than the plaintiffs themselves sought to certify, which he eventually did.
Even before their settlement agreement was judicially approved, the same defendants successfully raised the very fact of settlement negotiations as a bar to other LFPI claims in other States, or as a way to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiffs in those cases to prove that their cases are not included in the settlement in Florida. See, e.g.,Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 *2-*3 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014)(granting “limited injunction” against defendants foreclosing on plaintiffs’ home so as to allow the plaintiffs to prove that their case is not included in the Fladell settlement); Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 819385 *2 (W.D. Okla. March 3, 2014)(granting defendants’ motion to stay LFPI claims of plaintiffs who were not parties in the Florida case, unless those plaintiffs could prove that their claims were not settled in Fladell); Ursomano v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 644340 *1-*2 (N.D. Cal. February 19, 2014)(granting defendants’ motion to stay LFPI claims alleged by people who were not parties to the Florida case because the Fladell settlement might bar them).
The Federal Court in Florida never considered let alone adjudicated any of the issues raised by the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary certification of a class in Fladell.
Yesterday I submitted Comments to proposed joint rulemaking by five (5) Federal agencies. Flood Insurance is the topic of their proposed Rules. The period for public Comments closes one week from today, on December 29, 2014.
Specifically, the five agencies jointly requested Comments on their proposed Rules regarding “Loans in Areas Having Special Flood Hazards”. What follows is the first of my Comments.
If you disagree with my Comments I urge you to tell the agencies so, by leaving your own Comments. If you agree with my Comments I urge you to tell the agencies so, by leaving your own Comments.
Everything you need is here. You can leave your Comments at the Federal eRulemaking Portal. The web address is given below. Or you can send a joint EMail to the five agencies. Their EM Addresses are listed below too. In either case, the “subject line” or “re clause” information that you need for your Comments is also set out below for your ease of use.
Re: “Loans in Areas Having Special Flood Hazards”.
OCC: Docket ID OCC-2014-0016
Board: Docket No. R-1498
RIN 7100-AE22
FDIC: “Loans in Areas Having
Special Flood Hazards”.
FCA: “Law & Regulations”/“FCA Regulations”
/“Public Comments”
NCUA: RIN 3133-AE40
To the Agencies:
SUMMARY OF MY COMMENTS IN THIS LETTER:
* * *
(2) My second Comment adds a provision which would clarify the standard which a lender or servicer must meet in complying with the proposed escrow requirement. The standard which such a lender or servicer must meet is the standard of conduct of a fiduciary in its dealings with the borrower’s flood insurance escrow account which the proposed Rule will now require.
* * *
(2) My second Comment concerns the new escrow requirement. I would add a new provision to the proposed Rule, as follows:
The escrow account required in the first paragraph of this section, and by the Flood Disaster Protection Act, as amended, of all premiums and fees for any flood insurance required under these Rules and by the FDPA, as amended, shall be maintained by the mortgage lender or servicer as a fiduciary of the funds of the borrower.
This provision would establish the responsibility required by the escrow requirement in a single standard of performance. The FDPA, as amended, and the proposed Rule establish the required escrow account. It clearly sets out the measure of behavior which must be met by any mortgage lender or servicer which is thereby required to manage the newly required escrow account.
This provision set out in my second Comment would set forth a new provision in the following Rules of the five (5) respective joint Agencies involved:
OCC: This would add a new 12 CFR § 22.5(a)(4).
Board: This would add a new 12 CFR § 208.25(e)(1)(iv).
FDIC: This would add a new 12 CFR § 339.5(a)(4).
FCA: This would add a new 12 CFR § 614.4935(a)(4).
In another ground-breaking decision this week, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a certified question from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals about assigning bad faith claims in Pennsylvania. In another decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a judgment based on a verdict against Walmart for $188 Million. Of greater importance to other participants in the judicial system if not to the litigants in that particular case, the Court approved the proofs of both liability and damages employed in that class action case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s stunning new class action decision was addressed yesterday on Insurance Claims and Issues Blog.
In Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 7088147 *1 (Pa. December 15, 2014), in another decision this week the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also addressed a certified question from the Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit certified a question “to clarify whether, under Pennsylvania law, an insured may assign the right to recover damages from his insurance company deriving from the insurer’s bad faith toward the insured.”
The bad faith claim in the certified question case involves liability insurance and an alleged bad faith failure to settle. Karl Zierle was insured under an auto liability policy issued by Allstate Property and Casualty. Mr. Zierle was at the wheel of a vehicle which rear-ended Jared Wolfe’s vehicle. Mr. Wolfe sued Mr. Zierle for damages.
Allstate failed to settle the claims alleged by Mr. Wolfe against its insured, Mr. Zierle. A judgment was ultimately entered against Mr. Zierle which was broken out into a $15,000.00 award for compensatory damages and a $50,000.00 assessment of punitive damages. Allstate satisfied only the compensatory damages component and Zierle assigned any bad-faith rights he might have against Allstate to Wolfe in exchange for Wolfe’s forbearance on execution of the punitive damages component.
Mr. Zierle’s potential bad-faith claims in Pennsylvania apparently included rights under Pennsylvania’s bad-faith statute. In turn, Pennsylvania’s bad-faith statute allows for the assessment of punitive damages against an insurance carrier for its alleged bad faith.
After obtaining the assignment of Mr. Zierle’s bad-faith rights, Mr. Wolfe filed a claim against Allstate in Federal Court based on the Zierle-Wolfe assignment for alleged bad faith failure to settle. Wolfe alleged “that Allstate’s refusal to settle reflected bad faith on the carrier’s part” under both a “common-law contract theory” and under Pennsylvania’s bad-faith statute, Section 8371 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 7088147 *1 (Pa. December 15, 2014). “The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury discerned bad-faith conduct on the part of Allstate. As relevant here, the jury awarded $50,000 in punitive damages, as authorized under Section 8371.” Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 7088147 *2 (Pa. December 15, 2014).
Parenthetically, the jury in the later bad-faith case awarded the same amount of damage that was assessed against Mr. Zierle, Allstate’s insured, in the earlier liability case.
On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Federal Court bad-faith case, Allstate argued that the Zierle-Wolfe assignment of bad-faith-failure-to-settle claim presented an open question of whether rights are assignable under Section 8371. Allstate contended that such a claim was not assignable and was invalid as a matter of Pennsylvania State law.
The Third Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania whether this assignment is valid in Pennsylvania, and as noted, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court answered “Yes”:
We conclude that the entitlement to assert damages under Section 8371 may be assigned by an insured to the injured plaintiff and judgment creditor such as Wolfe. Having answered the certified question, we return the matter to the Third Circuit.
Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 7088147 *5 (Pa. December 15, 2014).
Insurability of punitive damages by another name, perhaps, as things turned out.
... Does the law clothe that Court Order with the mantle of res judicata to preclude the claims of every other person in any other case who might have been in the class (which was not certified except for the settlement)?
Can a party obtain the right to raise res judicata in other cases because of a Court-approved class action settlement in one action, that the party could not have obtained unless the Court approved a settlement because the Court never otherwise certified a class in that action?
That is the question arising from a class action settlement of lender force-placed insurance (“LFPI”) claims in a Federal case in Florida. The Court in that case approved a nation-wide class action settlement of LFPI claims, including the claims of absent persons, that had already or might be raised against the defendants in that case. The “Order Granting Final Approval to Class Action Settlement” in that case is reported at Fladell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 5488167 (S.D. Fla. October 29, 2014).
The date of this Order was October 29, 2014. The use of this settlement as a defense to LFPI litigation began months earlier, however. Apparently the parties in Fladell began talking about a national class action settlement as early as February, 2014. “On February 3, 2014 the parties in Fladell reached a settlement in principle,” anticipating a motion for preliminary approval of their class action settlement in March. A little over two weeks later, a Federal Court stayed an alleged LFPI class action involving California homeowners. The ground for the California Court’s Order was that a settlement in Florida in Fladell might preclude the LFPI class action alleged in the complaint which was filed in California in October, 2013. Ursomano v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 644340 *1-*2 (N.D. Cal. February 19, 2014).
As readers of this blog know, this makes the third reported case involving a defense that LFPI claims are precluded by a class action settlement of LFPI practices in Florida in Fladell. In the earlier of the other two decisions, a Federal Court in Oklahoma stayed an alleged LFPI class action because the Court in Oklahoma was advised by the defendants that the defendants were negotiating settlement with the parties in the Florida case, and in the other case, a Federal Court in the State of Washington conditionally enjoined a foreclosure proceeding and refused to immediately dismiss an alleged LFPI class action. In both cases, the defendants raised the settlement by the parties in Fladell as a bar —unless the plaintiffs in the other cases can show that they are not bound by the Court Order in Florida approving the Fladell settlement.
The proceedings in the Ursomano case paralleled the developments in both of these other cases. Ursomano contained both a request for a stay and, later, a dismissal. The proceedings are instructive. First, as noted, the California Court granted the defendants’ motion to stay because the Court was informed that the issues and allegations may be the same in Ursomano as in Fladell. (They arguably were not the same at all, but the Court was informed that they were. “It appears undisputed that the issues and putative classes are effectively the same in Fladell and Ursomano.” Ursomano v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 644340 *2 (N.D. Cal. February 19, 2014).) Even though the Court was under the impression that the issues were the same in both cases, the Court nonetheless stated that it recognized its duty, if and when a settlement agreement was actually written in Fladell, to “determine whether the terms release Defendants from liability from claims asserted herein and whether Plaintiffs and the putative classes are covered by the Fladell class.” Ursomano v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 644340 *2 (N.D. Cal. February 19, 2014). [Emphasis added.]
That never happened.
The Fladell case was settled, all right, but a close review of the Ursomano Court File on PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic Records”) does not show that anyone reviewed the terms of the Florida settlement agreement to see whether the terms release the same defendants from liability from claims asserted in California and whether the California plaintiffs and the Ursomano putative classes are covered by the Fladell case.
To say again, it never happened. There was no review, no comparison, no further argument.
The District Judge who wrote the February opinion in Ursomano was reassigned and another District Judge took his place. The new Judge ordered all parties to notify him if and when the Fladell case was settled. On October 29, 2014 – the same date on which the Florida Court gave its final approval to the Fladell settlement – the parties in California filed their joint “Statement Regarding Settlement” informing the Federal Court in California that the parties in Florida “have drafted a settlement agreement” and were then having it signed. Download URSOMANO Dkt 71 10.29.14 WELLS FARGO et al Notice re hope Fladell Settlement Agreement to be signed in 2 weeks. The next day, the Federal Court entered its Order of Dismissal giving any party 90 days to certify “that the agreed consideration for said settlement has not been delivered over”. If no certification of a failure of consideration for the settlement in Florida was filed within those 90 days, the dismissal in Ursomano would stand “with prejudice.” [Emphasis in original.] Download URSOMANO Dkt 73 10.30.14 Order of Dismissal.
The parties did file something other than a certification concerning the Florida settlement, however. Within two weeks, they filed their joint Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal on November 12, 2014. They did not address whether the claims or classes alleged in California were the same or similar as those alleged in Florida. However, they did point out to the Federal Court that their alleged classes were never certified in Ursomano. The plaintiffs were careful to obtain the defendants’ agreement that “the parties have reached a settlement of Plaintiffs’ individual claims against Defendants in which the Plaintiffs’ individual claims will be dismissed with prejudice and the members of any putative class will be dismissed without prejudice,” and, moreover, that while all individual claims of the individual claims were settled and should be dismissed with prejudice, under this stipulation “[a]ll claims and allegations of any putative class members are hereby dismissed without prejudice.” [Emphases added.] Download URSOMANO Dkt 74 11.12.14 STIP FOR DISMISSAL.
The Ursomano Court approved this Stipulation in a text-only entry on November 13, 2014, without a written Order:
Order by Hon. James Donato granting 74 Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Court dismisses this action with prejudice as to Mr. Canonico, Ms. Canonico and Mr. Ursomano and without prejudice as to the putative class. The putative class members retain all claims and causes of action, if any, against defendants. (This is a text-only entry. There is no document associated with this entry.) (jdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/13/2014) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
That concludes the saga of the Ursomano case. But that is not the end of the lender force-placed insurance saga by any means. For one thing, the Washington State case mentioned above is still pending, and the Oklahoma Federal Court case may be reopened. Beyond those two cases, there are many other LFPI class action cases which are pending and others which are likely to be filed in the future. Some of those LFPI class actions will involve the same defendants as in the Fladell case. So, the next question to be answered is one question which will determine whether any and all of these LFPI cases will be filed or, once filed, will be allowed to proceed:
Can a party obtain the right to raise res judicata in a Court-approved class action settlement, that the party could not have obtained otherwise because the Court never certified the class in that action?
When the Court-approved class action settlement is obtained in a case like Fladell, the answer might well be no.
The new decision came in the case of Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014). In it, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington refused to immediately dismiss a lawsuit filed by homeowners as a class action in Washington State over alleged practices of lenders and their agents in force-placing insurance.
The Court instead provisionally granted the named plaintiffs-homeowner’s motion to temporarily enjoin the defendants’ foreclosure sale of their home. The Federal Judge in the Western District of Washington ordered a temporary injunction subject to proof from the plaintiffs that they timely “opted out” of a Florida class action settlement which seemed to involve the same issues of alleged lender force-placed insurance practices:
Accordingly, as set forth below, the court will grant limited injunctive relief to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to come forward with evidence or argument that demonstrates that they opted out of the [Florida] settlement or that their claims are somehow not covered by the settlement.
Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 *2-*3 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014).
The Florida class action settlement was written and reached in a case called Fladell.
An earlier decision in a different District has come to light involving the same defendants and the same Florida class action settlement: Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 819385 (W.D. Okla. March 3, 2014). The Judge in Oklahoma took a different approach to the same issue, however. The Oklahoma Court found that “the alleged conduct of Wells Fargo on which Plaintiff bases her claims [in the Oklahoma case] constitutes the same factual predicate for the class claims in Fladell. A settlement in Fladell will likely prevent class members from subsequently asserting claims relying upon a legal theory or theories different from that relied upon in the class action complaint, but depending upon the same factual predicate.” Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 819385 *2 (W.D. Okla. March 3, 2014). Based on this finding, if the Oklahoma plaintiff did not “opt out” of the class certified in the Florida case, said the Oklahoma Judge, then the plaintiff’s case was resolved in Florida:
Under these circumstances, the Court finds a stay of this case is appropriate.
Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 819385 *2 (W.D. Okla. March 3, 2014).
On the same date that this Order was entered, the Oklahoma Court entered a second, separate Order which is not reported. In the unreported Order, the Court provided that any of the parties could request to reopen the proceedings closed by the reported Order. In any event, all parties were enjoined to report the disposition of the Florida class action settlement to the Oklahoma Judge.
PACER, the Public Access to Court Electronic Records which includes the Oklahoma Court’s electronic docket, shows that nothing was filed by the Clerk since the date of these Orders on March 3, 2014. No party has requested that the Oklahoma proceedings be reopened, apparently, and there is no record that any party has notified the Oklahoma Court of the Florida Fladell class action results, either.
It appears that a look at Fladell is in order. “Watch this space.”
The author is at work on a book on “Lender Force-Placed Insurance” which the American Bar Association has scheduled for publication in the Spring of 2015.
The Seventh Circuit has sent up a rocket of an opinon. The author of the opinion is Judge Richard Posner in the case of Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 6466128 (7th Cir. November 19, 2014). A check of the docket reflects that no further notice of appeal or petition for certiorari has been filed at this time.
In this consolidated set of appeals, all from cases involving State Consumer Protection Laws, the Seventh Circuit tracked Judge Posner's usual focus on detail ending with a devastating evaluation of the whole picture. The Court unanimously rejected a U.S. District Judge's decision to approve a class action settlement particularly but not exclusively in the matter of an attorney's fee award. These are the figures reported by Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit in this ordinary case:
The settling plaintiffs requested attorney's fees of $4,500,000.00.
The District Judge awarded $1,930,000.00 in attorney's fees.
The class plaintiffs who submitted claims received $865,284.00.
The factors elaborated in the decision rejecting this class action settlement are broken out for view in a post to be continued on Insurance Claims and Issues Blog. Suffice it to say as the Seventh Circuit did, in memorable words written by Judge Posner on the big picture in this typical class action settlement while stepping back from all these individual factors and looking at the class action as a whole:
And for conferring these meager benefits class counsel should receive almost $2 million?
Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 6466128 *9 (7th Cir. November 19, 2014).
Please Read The Disclaimer. Copyright 2014 by Dennis J. Wall. No claim to Original U.S. Government Works.
Class action settlements provide many issues separate and apart from the substance of the cases. There is no better example at hand than lender force-placed insurance (“LFPI”) cases.
In Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014), the issue was whether a class action settlement in Florida barred lender force-placed insurance claims in Washington State.
The claimants in Washington State are Scott and Marnie Keller, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, i.e., an alleged class in that case. The Kellers alleged “claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the [Washington State] Consumer Protection Act.” Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 *2 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014). [Emphasis added.] These alleged claims were based on insurance that was placed by force by Wells Fargo. It appears from the brief opinion that the Kellers alleged that Wells controlled their mortgage escrow; in all likelihood, the two Wells Fargo defendants sued by the Kellers were the mortgage lender or mortgage servicer, or the agent of either of these [hereinafter collectively referred to as “Wells Fargo” or “Wells”].
The Kellers alleged that they continuously maintained “hazard insurance” on their home from the day they purchased it on October 27, 2004. The Kellers’ annual premium for this insurance was $1,331.00.
Wells Fargo paid the premiums for the Kellers’ insurance from the Kellers’ escrow account, for awhile. Apparently, on or about October 29, 2010, a policy of insurance force-placed by Wells Fargo took effect on the Kellers’ home. The Kellers alleged that there was a balance of $1,662.00 in their escrow account at the time which, they alleged, was more than sufficient to pay the annual premium of the insurance on their home.
Allegedly Wells Fargo notified the Kellers for the first time in January, 2011 of the insurance which was force-placed effective October 29, 2010. In January, 2011, Wells Fargo allegedly also notified the Kellers – for the first time – not only that Wells had force-placed insurance but that it had done so at a cost charged to the Kellers of $3,492.00.
The Kellers refused to pay the increase in their monthly mortgage payments. They continued to pay their monthly mortgage amount of $1,149.59 during this entire period, until Wells allegedly did not accept their mortgage payments any longer. “On May 1, 2013, Wells Fargo refused the Kellers’ mortgage payment” and on “August 5, 2013, the Kellers received a notice of default stating that they were” in arrears. “The Kellers have approximately $100,000 of equity in their home.” Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 *1 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014).
The Kellers filed a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the foreclosure sale of their home. Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 *1 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014). Wells defended against the motion by alleging in turn that the claims of the Kellers had been settled in an LFPI class action settlement in Florida.
Specifically, Wells alleged that the Kellers had not timely “opted out” of the LFPI class action settlement in Florida, and that as a result their claims were no longer valid.
The Federal Judge in Washington State included Wells’ arguments in granting the Kellers’ request for a preliminary injunction, applying four (4) tests enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating claims for preliminary injunctive relief:
“Likelihood of Success on the Merits.” Under the allegations summarized above, the Court held that the Kellers satisfied this element – for the time being. “Accordingly, as set forth below, the court will grant limited injunctive relief to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to come forward with evidence or argument that demonstrates that they opted out of the [Florida] settlement or that their claims are somehow not covered by the settlement.”
“Irreparable harm.” “The court finds that the loss of plaintiffs’ home, which has more than $100,000 in equity, would result in irreparable harm.”
“Balance of the Equities.” Balancing the money damages which Wells might incur because of a delay in the foreclosure sale against the plaintiffs’ loss of their home, the Court concluded that this element, too, is satisfied in this LFPI case.
“Public Interest.” The Court held that the public interest is satisfied by a preliminary injunction of the defendant’s foreclosure sale of the plaintiffs’ home in this case. “Plaintiffs have consistently made their mortgage payments on time and raised serious questions as to whether defendant caused the deficiency at issue here.”
Keller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6684895 *2-*3 (W.D. Wash. November 25, 2014).
A check of the PACER files (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) on the day this article is written shows no significant activity since this decision was issued. It is interesting to note that in applying the four standard factors for any preliminary injunction in this lender force-placed insurance case:
The Court did not hold that the bank would be irreparably harmed by temporarily enjoining a foreclosure sale based on refusal to pay – i.e., based on nonpayment – of lender force-placed insurance premiums.
The Court similarly did not hold that the equities favored the lender in securing the collateral – the Kellers’ house -- for its mortgage loan.
And the Court likewise did not hold that the public interest would somehow be served by allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed despite the claims alleged by the homeowners concerning the lender’s forced placement of insurance in this case.
Sometimes what a Court did not hold can be as illuminating as what a Court did hold.
This is a theme that also bears watching in our next post. In it, we will examine a decision by Judge Posner concerning Federal Court approval of settlements in class action cases. His opinion for a unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit did not just break ground in reviewing class action settlements. Judge Posner’s opinion sets off rockets.
To be continued ….
The author is at work on a book on “Lender Force-Placed Insurance” which the American Bar Association is scheduling for publication in the Spring of 2015.
Please Read The Disclaimer. Copyright 2014 by Dennis J. Wall. All rights reserved. No claim to Original U.S. Government Works.
