This is the second part of a two-part article featuring Federal class action procedures as explained by a U.S. District Judge in a lender force-placed insurance case, Wilson v. Everbank, N.A., No. 14-CIV-22264, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 265648 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2015). The author is at work on a book on "Lender Force-Placed Insurance Practices" which the American Bar Association has scheduled for publication in the Spring of 2015.
The continuing discussion below is taken without change from the U.S. District Court's opinion at page *18:
By contrast, courts have addressed lack of standing claims prior to considering certification and dismissed claims asserted by the named plaintiff under state statutory schemes enacted to protect the interests or citizens of a particular state, where that named defendant had no connection to the statute at issue. See, e.g., Renzi v. Demilec (USA) LLC, 2013 WL 6410708, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2013) (holding that Florida plaintiff lacked standing to bring state statutory claims parallel to her FDUTPA claim on behalf of a national class because “plaintiffs may only assert a state statutory claim if the named plaintiff resides in that state”); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371-72 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (named plaintiffs could not pursue antitrust claims under state statutes from states in which they did not reside because “[n]one of these statutes authorizes antitrust actions based on commerce in other states”); Stone v. Crispers Restaurants, Inc., 2006 WL 2850103, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2006) (named plaintiff himself lacked standing to pursue claims under wage law of his or other states).
Here, the named Plaintiffs each have standing to assert their common law unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims under the laws of Florida, New York and Illinois, respectively. Indeed, the Insurer Defendants do not challenge their individualized standing. Rather, they argue that Plaintiffs are precluded, jurisdictionally, from bringing parallel claims under the laws of the other forty-seven states of the Union, and should be limited to asserting claims only on behalf of Florida, New York and Illinois citizens. The Court declines to preempt the class certification analysis by considering the standing issue at this logically precedent stage in the litigation. Plaintiffs are not attempting to piggyback on the claims of unnamed putative class members or gain access to state statutes whose protection they do not warrant, but rather, to seek redress for what they allege to be common injuries suffered by EverBank borrowers, nationwide. The Court's consideration of the standing issue as a precursor to class certification is not compelled either by precedent, logic, or case management considerations. Contra Xi Chen Lauren v. PNC Bank, N.A., 296 F.R.D. 389, 391 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (finding that “deferral would trigger extensive discovery costs and delay”).
End of Part 2 of 2. Please Read The Disclaimer. Copyright 2015 by Dennis J. Wall. All rights reserved. No claim to Original U.S. Government Works.