Claims and Bad Faith Law Blog

INTERPRETING THE VIRUS EXCLUSION: "THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX."

 

(LexisNexis)  In Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-265, 2020 WL 7249624 (E.D. Va. December 9, 2020), a Federal District Court denied State Farm's motion to dismiss a Business Interruption claim based on COVID-19 despite a Virus Exclusion.

The plaintiff-policyholder is a spa.  It bought an all-risk commercial property insurance policy from State Farm.   It made claims under that policy for Business Interruption losses both for the time when it voluntarily closed its doors for business, and through the time that followed Executive Orders which required it to close.  State Farm denied the claims based in part on the policy's Virus Exclusion.

The spa sued for coverage and alleged bad-faith damages.  State Farm filed its motion to dismiss.  The District Court's analysis was simple and basic analysis of coverage under an all-risk insurance policy.

The policyholder making a claim under an all-risk policy first has to establish coverage.  Here, that meant establishing that the claimed losses were caused by "accidental direct physical loss" to the property.

The Federal Court found that Virginia Courts have applied a "spectrum of accepted interpretations" of "direct physical loss" in the case law, and the Federal Court applied the interpretation most favorable to coverage in this case since the carrier had the opportunity to limit and define the phrase in the policy, but did not.

 "Based on the case law, the Court finds that it is plausible that a fortuitous 'direct physical loss' could mean that the property is uninhabitable, inaccessible, or dangerous to use because of intangible, or non-structural, sources."  Elegant, 2020 WL 7249624, at *10.

Coverage having been established -- or more accurately in the context of this case, a plausible claim to coverage having been established -- the next step of the analysis is whether coverage under the all-risks policy is excluded.  That brings us, as it brought the Court, to the Virus Exclusion at issue here.

The burden is on the all-risks carrier to show the applicability of an Exclusion.  In this case, the all-risks carrier did not meet its burden.  This was so even in the face of a more or less standard Virus Exclusion which a vast majority of Courts across the country have interpreted to exclude Business Interruption claims arising from COVID-19.

But not in this case.  The Court in this case was not intimidated by reports of a majority view of Virus Exclusions. 

The Court's approach is a lesson in coverage interpretation and not just for interpretation of all-risks policies.  Here, the Court thought "outside the box," and counsel for policyholders and counsel for insurance companies alike would do well to take notice.

The facts alleged in the policyholder's complaint did not depend on a virus.  The policyholder did not allege either that COVID-19 was present at the spa or that COVID-19 was the direct cause of physical loss to Covered Property.  See Elegant, 2020 WL 7249624, at *13.  In basic and simple terms, the plaintiff's claim to coverage was based on alleged losses due to a threat risk, and not a virus.

Next, the Court turned its attention to the language in the all-risks policy at issue.  Interpretation of an insurance policy is a legal issue.  The Court held that, as a matter of law, the Virus Exclusion at bar "applies where a virus has spread throughout the property."  Elegant, 2020 WL 7249624, at *12.  Therefore the Virus Exclusion at bar does not apply to the facts alleged in this particular case.  To put it another way, the all-risks carrier failed to meet its burden to show that the Virus Exclusion applies to the spa's Business Interruption claims.  Elegant, 2020 WL 7249624, at *13.

Coverage was plausibly alleged, sufficiently enough to withstand the carrier's motion to dismiss based on its Virus Exclusion.  In accordance with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, the Court also denied the carrier's motion to dismiss the policyholder's bad-faith claim, which the carrier had urged should be dismissed because there was no coverage.  However, as noted, the Court held to the contrary at this stage of the case.  Therefore, coverage having been plausibly alleged, the carrier's argument for dismissal of the bad-faith claim was politely but firmly rejected.  Elegant, 2020 WL 7249624, at *14.

To say again what was said here as recently as December 17, 2020, "The pandemic has revealed many things.  Who knew that interpreting insurance policies would be among the things revealed?"

More of these revelations will be explored in a forthcoming ABA Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal (Spring 2021) article by Dennis J. Wall, Remedies in Business Litigation:  Update on Business Income Losses in the Coronavirus Pandemic.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

THE PANDEMIC HAS REVEALED MANY THINGS. VIRUS EXCLUSION INTERPRETATION DISPLAYED.

(LexisNexis)

In Franklin EWC, Inc. v. Hartford Fin. Serv's Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-04434-JSC, 2020 WL 7342687 (N.D. Cal. December 14, 2020) (Corley, USMJ), a U.S. Magistrate Judge found that Sentinel Insurance Company's attempt to add a "virus exclusion" to its Business Owner's policy was legitimate, that the language of the virus exclusion was unambiguous and so it should be applied in that case to exclude coverage for a Business Interruption claim.

None of the parties or their lawyers appear to have raised the issue of the insurance carrier's placement of the exclusion in that policy.  The record in the case is on display in PACER.  Volumes are revealed by reading the policy itself as in any case and in this case, by reading the policy on PACER.

By its own terms, the insurance policy at issue in that case added the purported virus exclusion "to Paragraph B.1. Exclusions of the Standard Property Coverage Form," in pertinent part.  Franklin EWC, Inc. v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., Dkt. No. 10-1 at p. 127 (N.D. Cal. Case No. 20-cv-04434-JSC).

The carrier added the virus exclusion with its own chosen label of Exclusion "i".

However, there already was an Exclusion i in the policy, a Pollution Exclusion.  Franklin EWC, Inc. v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., Dkt. No. 10-1 at pp. 47-48 (N.D. Cal. Case No. 20-cv-04434-JSC).

The Magistrate did not mention this, whether or not the parties and their lawyers ever mentioned it in this coverage case.

The identical policy language and policy arrangement were at issue in Urogynecology Specialist of Fla., LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 6:20-cv-1174-Orl-22EJK, 2020 WL 5939172 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2020). 

There, among other things in her opinion in that case, the District Judge pointed out that it appears to be ambiguous, that it does not seem logical, to classify a virus as a pollutant.  By labelling the attempted Virus Exclusion as Exclusion i in an endorsement to the main policy, the carrier in that case was apparently writing an insurance policy that would exclude damage caused by the virus as damage caused by pollutants described in Exclusion i in the Coverage Form.  See Urogynecology Specialist of Fla., LLC v. Sentinel Insurance Co., 2020 WL 5939172, at *4.

The arrangement of the policy forms and specifically the identification of the new "virus exclusion" with the policy's Pollution Exclusion gives rise to ambiguity.  And it is axiomatic, as they say, that ambiguous insurance policies are construed against the insurance companies which drafted them in the first place.

Such was the case for several reasons in Urogynecology Specialist of Fla., LLC v. Sentinel Insurance Co.

More was the case in Urogynecology Specialist of Fla., LLC v. Sentinel Insurance Co., as well.  The Court carefully pointed out in that case, that its interpretation of insurance coverage for losses caused in a pandemic was itself taking place in a pandemic:

Importantly, none of the cases dealt with the unique circumstances of the effect COVID-19 has had on our society—a distinction this Court considers significant. Thus, without any binding case law on the issue of the effects of COVID-19 on insurance contracts virus exclusions, this Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim at this juncture. Plaintiff alleged the existence of the insurance contract, losses which may be covered under the insurance contract, and Sentinel’s failure to pay for the losses. These allegations, when read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are facially plausible.

Urogynecology Specialist, 2020 WL 5939172, at *4.

The Magistrate in the Northern District of California did not mention the context of her policy interpretation, she just applied what she and apparently the lawyers in the case saw as the majority view, and that ended the matter for them.

The pandemic has revealed many things.  Who knew that interpreting insurance policies would be among the things revealed?

More of these revelations will be explored in a forthcoming ABA Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal (Spring 2021) article by Dennis J. Wall, Remedies in Business Litigation:  Update on Business Income Losses in the Coronavirus Pandemic.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

MAJORITY WINNER RECOGNIZED ON ISSUE OF POST-LOSS ASSIGNMENT ...

... OF PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIM.

(Matt Whittaker / New York Times)

In Johnson v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., No. 118689, 2020 WL 7349186 (Okla. December 15, 2020) (stated not released for official publication at this time),  the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that a majority of Courts addressing the issue has held that an insured's post-loss assignment of its property insurance coverage claim to a contractor is valid.  The Supreme Court held in this case that such a post-loss assignment is the permissible assignment of a chose in action, and not an impermissible assignment of the policy.

    The Oklahoma Supreme Court's framing and resolution of this issue is so well-stated that no attempt to summarize it can improve it.  Here is how the Supreme Court stated the matter:

    This case involves an insured assigning a post-loss property insurance claim to a construction company for the purpose of the company repairing her property after a storm. Insurer argued the insured property owner was required to obtain written consent from the insurer prior to making the assignment. We agree with a majority of courts stating an insured's post-loss assignment of a property insurance claim is an assignment of a chose in action and not an assignment of the insured's policy. We hold insured's assignment was not prohibited by either the insurance policy or 36 O.S. § 3624. We conclude the District Court's judgment was erroneous when it dismissed the construction company as a party because written consent for the assignment was not provided by insurer to the insured. We reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings. The insurer's motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

Johnson, 2020 WL 7349186, at p. *1, ¶ 1.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

FILED RATE DOCTRINE AT WORK IN A SLIGHTLY FRACTURED COURT.

(Algae Bloom in Lake Sinclair. Image by NASA)

In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Stein, ___ S.E.2d ___, Nos. 271A18 & 401A18, 2020 WL 7294770 (N.C. December 11, 2020), a somewhat fractured North Carolina Supreme Court faced a filed-rate decision from a North Carolina State administrative agency, the Utilities Commission.  The utilities' rate filing involved unlined storage pits of coal ash.

In particular, the decision of the North Carolina agency concerned passing on the costs of "engineering and regulatory compliance," i.e., cleanup.

The ultimate decision was largely to affirm the decisions of the North Carolina Utilities Commission.  Putting the merits of the administrative and judicial decisions to one side, it is the several opinions of the majority, and of the justices who dissented in part and concurred in part, that draw attention.  These judicial opinions illustrate the working of the filed rate process in State administrative agencies and in State Courts, a procedure which is always tied to the evidence in the record.

This stands in some contrast to the acceptance without the requirement of any evidence to support the distinct but dependent federal "filed rate doctrine" in many federal courts.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

EXPERT ADJUSTER TESTIMONY IN BAD FAITH CASE ALLOWED.

(Brennan Linsley / Associated Press)

The insurance bad faith case of Daniels v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 19-10632, 2020 WL 7183363 (E.D. La. December 7, 2020), arose out of a mortgage foreclosure.

The plaintiffs in the bad-faith case were the plaintiffs in the foreclosure case. Fixtures on the property they foreclosed on were damaged.  After the insurance company investigated the resulting claim for losses, it issued a check payable to the plaintiffs as mortgagees and loss payees and, in accordance with the Commercial Lines policy involved in the matter, also made the owner a payee on the check.

The mortgagees thought that the owner, an entity called Kai Pond, was responsible for the damage.  The mortgagees even had the peril of property damage by Kai Pond made an explicit risk assumed under the policy.

It is not stated in the opinion, but apparently the check was negotiated.  In any event, the plaintiffs were not happy with the amount they received from the insurance company's payment.  The plaintiffs sued various defendants, among them the insurance company which they sued for alleged breach of contract and bad faith.

The issue at hand was whether the damage was "caused by others" within the meaning of the policy.  As the Court explained it, the issue was not whether the property owner could be one of the "others," but in basic terms the issue was instead whether the damage was caused by perils other than various natural forces which do not involve human action.

The plaintiffs produced an expert witness report by one Kotter.  Mr. Kotter's proffered expertise was in insurance adjusting.  The defendants challenged Kotter's opinions as totally inadmissible; they did not challenge Kotter's capacity to testify as an expert insurance adjuster.

A federal judge allowed the opinions in Mr. Kotter's report that the defendants found offensive, and declined to strike his report or to declare his testimony as an expert inadmissible on these points.   However, the Court went on to grant the motion as to a part of the Kotter report and some of the Kotter opinions:

    Scottsdale does not argue that Kotter is unqualified to testify as an expert insurance adjustor. Rather, Scottsdale argues that Kotter's vague statement that the damage was “caused by others” is unhelpful to determining the actual cause of the damage and that his opinions are based on unreliable evidence. After reviewing the record and Kotter's report, the Court finds that Kotter's report is reliable and relevant to the extent of most of the limited opinions it contains. Kotter's opinion that the damage was caused by others is helpful in that it excludes perils not caused by “human interaction” including fire, water, or natural disaster. Kotter also includes a cost estimate of the allegedly damaged or lost items which could be helpful to the trier of fact. Any issues Scottsdale has with these limited opinions can be addressed through cross-examination and the presentation of countervailing expert testimony. However, Kotter's report also includes an opinion that there was a “gross underpayment of the claim” that “resulted in Plaintiffs incurring the cost of litigation.” These statements are impermissible legal conclusions or factual determinations reserved for the trier of fact, which Kotter will not be permitted to offer at trial.

Daniels, 2020 WL 7183363, at *4.

This ruling is in line with the vast majority of rulings on expert witnesses and their opinion testimony in federal courts.  Most expert opinions are admissible, depending on what is in the record and what in the record the expert reviewed.  However, even the record will not permit an expert to testify to legal conclusions in the case or, as the judge ruled in this case, to "factual determinations reserved for the trier of fact[.]"

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

"WHERE'S THE BEEF?" WHERE'S THE PUBLIC IN THIS?

(Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services)

"Plaintiff David DeHate filed his complaint on October 18, 2019, alleging claims for negligence and premises liability arising from an incident at defendant's store in Hemet, California, in which a former employee of defendant allegedly dropped a pallet of flooring material on plaintiff's foot."  DeHate v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, No. ED CV 19-2505-JGB (SPx), 2020 WL 7084551 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2020) (USMJ).

Plaintiff filed suit against Lowe's for alleged negligence and premises liability, and Lowe's removed the case to federal court.  In light of subsequent rulings, certainly, this was a good tactical move.

Lowe's had a surveillance video which showed the accident apparently.  From the beginning of the suit, DeHate asked Lowe's to give him the surveillance video and documents related to the accident.  Likewise, once the lawsuit was removed to federal court, Lowe's never stopped asking for a stipulated protective order that would limit use of the surveillance and any of the documents to DeHate's use in this lawsuit only.

Ultimately, Mr. DeHate's lawyer verbally agreed to limit use of the material to the current lawsuit only.  This was not good enough for Lowe's, which understandably wanted the agreement committed to writing.  Lowe's filed a motion for a protective order, there being no stipulated protective order.

Viewing the surveillance tape would reveal the location of the cameras in the Lowe's store.  If that information was released to third parties outside the lawsuit, the world would know, essentially, where the cameras were hidden in that store.  "Shoplifters beware," was basically Lowe's cry about the surveillance tape.  The Magistrate heard the cry, looked at the record in this case, and granted the motion for protective order regarding the surveillance video.  See DeHate, 2020 WL 7084551, at *3.

The documents in question reflect Lowe's surveillance practices and procedures so they too were ruled protected here.    DeHate, 2020 WL 7084551, at *3.

These rulings came without discussion of any public interest in access to these materials.  Perhaps the public had no interest given the nature of the materials, but perhaps it did.  We do not know because there was no discussion in the Magistrate's opinion.  Consideration at least of the public's interest in access to judicial proceedings seems to be a requirement in the Ninth Circuit where the Central District of California -- in which these rulings were made -- is located of course.

If Lowe's asked for a protective order, it had to show the Court what it wanted the Magistrate to protect.  To protect those materials from public view, Lowe's would ordinarily have had to request that they be sealed before Lowe's filed them with its motion for a protective order.  Yet there is no mention of this in the opinion.

Further, Ninth Circuit case law apparently would treat the motion in this case as a "non-dispositive motion" but would still require the moving party to show "good cause" for the secrecy.  Lowe's may have satisfied this standard; certainly this Magistrate was satisfied with two declarations which Lowe's filed in support of its motion.  One declaration was from the store manager; the other declaration was from the lawyer for Lowe's.  See DeHate, 2020 WL 7084551, at *1-*4.  But if Lowe's satisfied the "good faith" standard, we do not know because this Magistrate did not address the question.

We only know that the Magistrate said that her rulings were good for the parties.  She balanced DeHate's and Lowe's' interests here.  DeHate, 2020 WL 7084551, at *4.  That is as far as she went, however.  Her rulings were like a return to the "before time," when publicly funded litigation was viewed strictly as the private preserve of private parties.

She did not put the public's interest on her scales and balance the public's interest in accessing any of the materials, however.   The public's interest in access to judicial proceedings is guaranteed by the Constitution and by the common law in most American jurisdictions.  As a result, that interest is not lightly ignored.

The point is not that this Magistrate's discovery rulings were wrong.  She may have been right ultimately.  But the point is greater than that:  Because she did not tell us where the public came in, we will not know whether and what role the public right of access may play here, will never know how the interests of the public may affect disclosure of any of the materials at issue in this discrete case.  That seems to be why the Ninth Circuit has shaped procedures for judges and magistrates to follow in all cases.

That the Magistrate did not follow them in this case is a loss for the Court system and for the public, which pays for that system.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

DISCLOSING YOUR HORSE BARN REQUIRED NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS, NO CONFIDENTIAL BREACH.

(Photo via Wikipedia)

In an unpublished opinion in Barron v. Great Am. Assur. Co., 2020 IL App (1st) 182353-U, Nos. 1-18-23531-19-0656 cons., 2020 WL  7121448 (Ill. 4th DCA December 4, 2020), an Illinois appellate court upheld a trial court's orders dismissing the plaintiff's case and refusing to reconsider the ruling.

The plaintiff sued Great American over the conduct of the carrier's employees relative to the plaintiff's equine insurance policy.  Ms. Barron boarded a horse, and received other equine services, at a stable.  While the horse was at the stable, it suffered from multiple fractures of one of its legs and the horse was euthanized.

For some reason which does not specifically appear in the appellate opinion, and is perhaps vague in plaintiff's complaint, she allegedly gave the carrier confidential information.

The confidential information in question allegedly included her disclosure of the fact that the stable required nondisclosure agreements from its employees.  Barron, 2020 WL 7121448, at *2, ¶ 10.

The plaintiff apparently gave the carrier this information before she sued the stable and the stable's owner.  After that suit, she sued the carrier alleging breach of contract, bad faith due to improper claims handling prohibited by various Illinois statutes, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of an Illinois statute by virtue of the carrier's alleged disclosure of alleged confidential and privileged information, among other alleged causes of action.

As noted the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these claims and also affirmed the trial court's refusal to reconsider.  In a somewhat lengthy opinion that covers some 11 pages of the Westlaw report, the appellate court pointed out in basic and simple terms that the plaintiff's allegations and claims were not specific enough to withstand the carrier's motion to dismiss.

Specifically with regard to the claim alleged for breach of confidential and privileged information in violation of an Illinois statute, the appellate court point out that the statute in question does not apply to equine insurance which, again as noted, was the type of insurance involved in this case.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

 

WILDFIRE LOSS, COVERAGE DENIED: NO CONTRACT BREACH, NO BAD FAITH.

(Jose Carlos Fajardo / San Jose Mercury News, Associated Press)

In Jackquart v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 19-cv-2480-WJM-KMT,  2020 WL 7055500 (D. Colo. December 2, 2020), the Court was faced with a claim of losses from a wildfire.

The losses came from the destruction of a structure away from the "residence premises" identified in the homeowner's policy at issue.  In fact, the evidence reflected that the uses made by the policyholders of this structure -- which was located 119 miles away from their covered home -- were not consistent with the use of a covered structure away from the residence premises "in connection with the residence premises," in pertinent part:

    Apart from Plaintiffs’ ownership of both properties, Plaintiffs have not established that there is a credible link, relationship, or association between the Primary Residence and the La Veta Property. In addition to being located 119 miles away from the Primary Residence (see ECF No. 46-3), Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the La Veta Property as a getaway was distinct from their use of the Primary Residence.

Jackquart, 2020 WL 7055500, at *5. 

Further, Mr. Jackquart testified that the structure was "investment property that the Plaintiffs planned to sell at the time of the fire."  Even further still, at the time of the fire they had a contract to sell it.  Jackquart, 2020 WL 7055500, at *6.

On this record, the Court granted the homeowners carrier's motion for summary judgment that there was no insurance coverage under the policy at issue and so there was no breach of contract when the carrier denied coverage.  Since there was no insurance coverage, it followed under Colorado law as under the law of the vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States, that there was no bad faith.  Accordingly, the Court also granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment on the bad faith claim in that case.

The holdings of Courts across the United States that where there is no insurance coverage, there is no bad faith, are addressed in 1 Dennis J. Wall, Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith § 3:28 (third-party cases) (Thomson Reuters West 3d ed. & 2020 Supps);  and in id., Volume 2, §§ 9:1 & 9:14 (first-party cases).

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.  

SAYIN' DON'T MAKE IT SO: "CONFIDENTIAL" DESIGNATIONS v. PUBLIC RIGHTS.

(Image by NASA)

The recent decision in Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm's Corp., No. 17-cv-04405-HSG, 2020 WL 7027432 (N.D. Cal. November 30, 2020), explores what seems to be all the necessary issues that surround getting a Federal Court to seal a document in a case in the Ninth Circuit and perhaps the nation.

First, there is the question of the American public's right of access to documents filed in court cases.  If the document is part of a filing submitted to a Court when asking the Court for a ruling, then the document is presumptively accessible to the public and it cannot be sealed without a showing of "extraordinary circumstances."  Plexxikon Inc., 2020 WL 7027432, at *1.

In contrast, if the document is not part of a filing designed to elicit a dispositive ruling from the Court, i.e., if it is attached to "a non-dispositive motion," then the party seeking to seal it must instead show "good cause" to seal it.  The showing of "good cause" to seal is a "particularized showing" of specific harm or prejudice that would happen to the party seeking to seal a document if the document is not sealed.  Plexxikon Inc., 2020 WL 7027432, at *2.

In either situation, the party asking a judge to seal a document must do more than say that it is "confidential" or "highly confidential" just because a stipulated protective order allows that party to say those words.  In the view of the federal judge in this case, that is all that the party did when it asked the Court to allow it to file a second motion for summary judgment, asked the Court to seal attachments to its motion requesting leave, and also asked the Court to seal the party's objections to a Magistrate's Recommendation against sealing.  Plexxikon Inc., 2020 WL 7027432, at *2-*3.

Saying that the documents were "highly confidential" did not make them so, the Court ruled in effect.

The sealing motions were denied even applying the lower standard of "good cause" in this case.  Plexxikon Inc., 2020 WL 7027432, at *3.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

THE CASE OF THE STOLEN GIFT CARD INFORMATION.

(Photo by the author)

The case of Maritz Holdings Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 4:18-CV-00825 SEP, 2020 WL 7023952 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2020), came about in this way.  Maritz allegedly experienced cyber-security breaches.  At this time of the year in particular, gift cards are on our minds.  In the Maritz case, the cyber-security breaches endured by Maritz occurred because of gift cards.

Gift card information was allegedly stolen from Maritz.  It claimed coverage under insurance policies issued by Lloyds of London.  "Underwriters issued breach-response insurance coverage to Maritz[.]"  Maritz, 2020 WL 7023952, at *1.

Underwriters filed a motion to dismiss directed to Maritz's claim that the Underwriters' refusal to pay was vexatious and so actionable under Missouri "bad-faith" or vexatious refusal statute.  (Maritz also asked the Court to treat its motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The Court said the same standard would apply to measure the motion.)  In pertinent part, Underwriters argued that the vexatious-refusal-to-pay claim brought under the Statutes of Missouri should be dismissed because a choice-of-laws provision in the insurance policy required New York law to apply here, not Missouri law.

The Court disagreed with Underwriter and agreed with Maritz in this regard, that Missouri public policy mandates that Missouri law be applied when the protection of Missouri citizens is at stake:

 Maritz argues that an insurer should not be allowed to achieve that same end via a choice-of-law provision that works to strip Missouri insureds of the protections afforded by the vexatious refusal statute. The Court agrees.

Maritz, 2020 WL 7023952, at *3.

After announcing the public policy of Missouri, the Court upheld Maritz's vexatious refusal claim and denied Underwriters' motion to dismiss. 

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

EXPERT TESTIMONY TO ROUND OUT THE MONTH:   NEUROSURGEON & BAD FAITH.

(Photo courtesy of NASA)

In Jarman v. American Family Ins. Co., No. CV-18-00526-PHX-SMB, 2020 WL 7013957 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2020), the Court held that a neurosurgeon could still testify to facts observed as a fact witness even though the plaintiff-policyholder did not designate the neurosurgeon as an Expert Witness.  Under Arizona law, this included testimony about delay and denial in an insurance carrier's authorization and thus in the policyholder's treatment that were perceived in the eyes of the neurosurgeon.  Jarman, 2020 WL 7013957, at *1.

    However, the Court did not permit the neurosurgeon to testify in this bad-faith case that the insurance carrier's allegedly unreasonable delays and denials were part of a habit or pattern that the carrier followed "routinely in other cases."  That calls for the opinion testimony of an Expert, and this witness was not designated as such so that such testimony from this witness was excluded.  Jarman, 2020 WL 7013957, at *1.

    That takes care of the bad-faith portion of the Court's rulings.  Another ruling is of interest, parenthetically.  The Court declined to allow the neurosurgeon who had not been designated as an Expert Witness to testify to an Expert opinion that the carrier caused post-traumatic stress in its handling of the plaintiff's claim.  Jarman, 2020 WL 7013957, at *2.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

HAPPY THANKSGIVING, BUT POLICY'S PRIMARY BENEFICIARY RECEIVES LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS.

(Desiree Rios / New York Times)

TODAY IS THANKSGIVING DAY.  REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!

 

In D.S.S. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. & Time Warner Cable, No. 3:20-CV-248-CRS, 2020 WL 6877738 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2020), a federal court turned the defendant corporations' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and then granted them summary judgment on the claims of life insurance policy survivors.

Survivors brought suit to allege claims of breaches of contract and of fiduciary duty, bad faith, and violations of ERISA for the life insurance company's refusal to pay the survivors the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by the cable company on the deceased, a cable company employee.

The deceased was their mother.

There was evidence in the record, however, that the deceased had changed her beneficiary to a person who was not one of the suing survivors, in accordance with the plan and the policy.

So, in accordance with the plan and the policy, the life insurance company paid the proceeds of the policy to the primary beneficiary named on the policy.  Among other things, there was no bad faith on the part of the insurance company on this record, the judge ruled.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

CHALLENGING THE FILED RATE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIAL APPROACH.

When a filed rate is challenged in a proceeding made available by statute to challenge the rate, it is possible to allege and even to prevail on a complaint that the filed rate is excessive and should not be charged.  There is just no filed rate doctrine in such administrative proceedings, it appears.

Even when the persons challenging the rate as excessive file their own complaint "incorrectly" but they allege enough claims to merit the attention of the agency.  See Malott v. Summerland Sanitary Dist., 55 Cal. App. 5th 1102, ___ Cal. Rptr. 3d ___ (Cal. 2d DCA, Div. 6, October 19, 2020).

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

SECRET SETTLEMENT TALKS IN FACE OF KENTUCKY BAD FAITH ALLEGATIONS.

In Rebennack v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., ___ S.W.3d ___, Nos. 2018-CA-1494-MR &  2019-CA-0078-MR, 2020 WL 6811652, at *1-*2 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2020) (stated NOT FINAL), Kentucky's Court of Appeals kept any mention of settlement talks in the appellate briefs a secret.

Despite the fact that there were allegations of underlying bad faith failure to settle.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

"GOOD FAITH BELIEF" IN A STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER: WHOSE BELIEF?

Stipulated protective orders pretty universally require a "good faith belief" that the materials being marked "Confidential" are, in fact, worthy of being marked Confidential.  But whose good faith belief are we talking about?

(Photo by Peter Dejong/AP)

In some cases, this apparently means a good faith belief by the lawyers who marked the thing "confidential" in the first place.  See, e.g., Davey's Locker Sportfishing, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co., No. 8:20-cv-01424 JVS (JDEx), 2020 WL 6681858, at *1, GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) (Stipulated Protective Order signed by USMJ; boldface in original).

In other cases, this expressly constitutes "a representation by the party or nonparty and its counsel that they believe in good faith" that the material designated "confidential" is, in fact, confidential.  See, e.g., Mullins v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00192-CDL, 2020 WL 6706364, at *1, ¶ 3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2020) (Definition of Confidential Material in Stipulated Protective Order signed by U.S. District Judge; italics in original).

In still other cases, the last remaining alternative is written in the Stipulated Protective Order and the requisite "good faith" belief comes from "the producing party[.]"  Multicare Health Sys. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. C20-5559 TSZ, 2020 WL 6700924, at *1, ¶ 2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2020) ("'CONFIDENTIAL' MATERIAL" paragraph in Stipulated Protective Order signed by U.S. District Judge; all caps in original).

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

WHEN A COVERAGE DEFENSE 'RESIDENCE' IS FAIRLY DEBATABLE.

The short answer is:  when it is a complicated endeavor.

(Image courtesy of NASA)

In Bloxham v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:19-CV-004812020, WL 6710427 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2020) (Mehalchick, USMJ), a homeowner's insurance carrier denied coverage for a fire loss.  The carrier's coverage denial was premised on two related grounds:  that the claimant did not "reside" on the covered property and that there were "material misrepresentations" that he did.

The carrier's motion for summary judgment was denied including on a statutory claim of insurer bad faith.  The Court's announced reason after reviewing all the evidence on the question of the insured's "residence" in that particular case was this:  "Defining and determining the term 'reside' is a complicated endeavor."  Bloxham, 2020 WL 6710427, at *8.

The Court did not say so in this case but clearly it came to the conclusion after reviewing all the evidence that this coverage question was fairly or reasonably debatable.

That is the real reason that the carrier's motion for summary judgment based on that coverage question was denied.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

Business Interruption (BI) and COVID-19.

Like the people of the United States, not every virus exclusion looks alike.

        (Image courtesy New York Public Library Digital Collections)    

    Read your clients' policies before you decide whether and how to argue for or against insurance coverage for the pandemic.  See, e.g., Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker Blog News posted October 27, 2020,

"Not All Virus Exclusions Are Equal."

   

 

 

(Brennan Linsley /Associated Press)

    On a related note, read the cases to find the law, not just the headnotes.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

COMMENTS ON FEDERAL INFORMATION COLLECTION NOTICE DUE TOMORROW.

The organization that is still in control of the federal government proposes to collect information on "Federal and Non-Federal Financial Assistance Instruments" through the Forest Service.  The deadline for Comments on this proposal is tomorrow, Friday, November 13, 2020.  Now is the time to make your voice heard once again.

Feel free to use all or part of the Comments I left today, which are published below for your ease of reference.  Thank you for being a citizen.

Agency: FOREST SERVICE (FS)
Document Type: Notice
Title: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals:: Federal and Non-Federal Financial Assistance Instruments
Document ID: FS_FRDOC_0001-3384

Document No.:  2020-20195.

Comment:

BECAUSE THE NOTICE IS UNSUPPORTED BY FACTS, IT IS IN VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

The Notice contains unsupported statements that the actions described in it are authorized by Congress because they are exempted by Congress from statutes that would otherwise govern these actions: "The Forest Service issues partnership agreements under specific authorities exempt from the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act (FGCAA). This collection is for a new form that will be used to enter into [certain] agreement[s.]"

   The Notice further contains this advisory: "In addition to Federal Financial Assistance (FFA), Congress created specific authorizations for acts outside the scope of the FGCAA. Appropriations language was developed to convey authority for the Forest Service to enter into relationships that are outside the scope of the FGCAA. The Forest Service implements these authorizations using instruments such as collection agreements, FGCAA exempted agreements, memorandums of understanding, and other agreements which mutually benefit participating parties. These instruments fall outside the scope of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and often require financial plans and statements of work."

THE NOTICE FAILS TO SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFY THE AUTHORITY OR LEGAL BASIS FOR IT. FOR THAT ADDITIONAL REASON, IT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND CANNOT LAWFULLY BE IMPLEMENTED.

The exemptions are unidentified in this Notice except by reference generally to " the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act" and to "Federal Financial Assistance." "Authorization" to expend federal funds and enter into agreements is not specified. For these reasons, this Notice merits further attention.

    Background Information: This particular Notice is unusual in that it does not identify the specific statutory provisions on which it is based. The Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act is codified at 31 USCA § 6301 et seq. The federal government has provided a description of its operation at https://www.grants.gov/learn-grants/grant-policies/federal-grant-cooperative-agreement-act-1977.html.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, whether taken separately or together, the proposed Notice is unauthorized and contrary to law. Therefore it cannot lawfully be implemented. Thank you for your consideration of these Comments.

Please read the disclaimer.  This blog article ©2020 Dennis J. Wall; permission is freely given to leave Comments in response to this proposed federal Notice on regulations.gov, that may contain material from this article.  All other rights reserved.

MICHIGAN PENALTY INTEREST BEGINS WITH "SATISFACTORY PROOF OF LOSS."

Michigan provides for statutory "penalty interest" on delayed payment of claims.  However, the Michigan penalty-interest statute requires "satisfactory proof of loss," or penalty interest is not available.

    "This case cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Resolution of the case depends on when defendant received 'satisfactory proof of loss,' Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.2006(4), and this issue is disputed. Notably, the statute requires 'satisfactory proof,' not any proof, some proof, or partial proof."  Johnson Law, PLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 19-CV-11786, 2020 WL 6585540, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2020).

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

VOLUNTARY PAYMENT NO DEFENSE TO EXCESS CARRIER'S BAD-FAITH CLAIM.

(Image by Thomson Reuters West)

In Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 186 A.D.3d 1513, 130 N.Y.S.3d 847 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't, N.Y. 2020), it was held that "voluntary payment" was not a defense available to a primary carrier against an excess carrier's claim of insurer bad faith.

    As explained by the court in this case, the voluntary payment defense at common law is an affirmative defense in an action for the recovery of money which was voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts, in basic terms.

    In this case, the appellate court carefully explained that the voluntary payment doctrine has no place:

   Applying the common-law voluntary payment doctrine so as to bar actions alleging bad faith would allow primary insurance companies to benefit from their own bad conduct. Here, MetLife alleged that GEICO acted in bad faith by failing to timely notify MetLife of the underlying personal injury action commenced against their mutual insured, Colvin, by failing to timely apprise MetLife of developments in the underlying personal injury action, by failing to apprise MetLife that GEICO's tender of its policy limit to Gomez in the underlying personal injury action had been rejected, and by failing to adequately and properly defend Colvin in the underlying personal injury action. Moreover, in support of its motion, GEICO submitted copies of numerous emails and letters from MetLife's counsel and claims representative to GEICO requesting documents in order for MetLife to adequately assess Gomez's claim after being informed of the underlying personal injury action by Gomez's counsel and receiving a request from Gomez's counsel that MetLife tender its policy, as well as a copy of MetLife's reservation of rights letter issued to GEICO with respect to the settlement of the underlying personal injury action. As a result, we conclude that the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply in this action alleging bad faith.

Metropolitan Property & Casualty, 186 A.D.3d at ___, 130 N.Y.S.3d at ___ (page numbers not available at time of publication).

The voluntary payment doctrine is explored in the context of lender force-placed insurance practices in § 11:25, 2 Dennis J. Wall, Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith (3d ed. and 2020 Supps. Thomson Reuters West).  Actions by Excess Carriers and Defenses of Primary Carriers are the specific focus of §§ 7:7 - 7:18, inclusive, in Volume 1, id.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved. 

"REASONABLY DEBATABLE" COVERAGE QUESTION DECIDED IN FAVOR OF GOOD FAITH.

(Gridview_imagefull / Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services)

Chicago Title issued a title insurance policy to the appellants in the case of Jericho State Capital Corp. of Fla. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., ___ S.C. ___, 848 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. Ct. App. 2020).  The policyholders-appellants contended that the title insurance policy should have provided coverage to a claim based on an ordinance that the appellate panel described as "unusual."

    Although the underlying claim based on the ordinance was not clearly excluded from coverage under the title insurance policy at bar, the South Carolina Court of Appeals had little trouble holding that the claim was not excluded but covered. 

    After the South Carolina appellate court held that the coverage question was a close one, the appellate panel affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the policyholders'-appellants' bad-faith claim.  The latter holding was in line with the majority view of courts in the United States that the closeness of the coverage question prevented the viability of a bad faith claim against the title insurance carrier:

    Appellants’  bad faith cause of action fails because they did not demonstrate Chicago Title acted unreasonably in denying Appellants’ claims.  [Citation omitted.]  The unusual nature of the Ordinance presented close policy interpretation issues. Chicago Title had a reasonable basis for denying the claims, and we affirm summary judgment to them as to this issue.

Jericho State Capital, ___ S.C. at ___, 848 S.E.2d at ___ (at headnote 20; page numbers not available at the time of publication of this article).

      The appellate panel mentioned at the end of its opinion that it took no position on the policyholders'-appellants' apparently separate claim based on alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  This was the first time that the panel mentioned the existence of such a claim, but the panel did not treat it except to say that the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on that claim, too, had not been appealed and so was not before the court on appeal.

Fairly or Reasonably Debatable Claims are discussed collectively as a defense of Good Faith to claims of Insurer Bad Faith in 2 Dennis J. Wall, Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith § 11:17 (3d ed. and 2020 Supps. Thomson Reuters West).

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved. 

POSTSCRIPT TO JURISDICTION.

(Sun Sentinel photograph)

In a postscript to yesterday's article on Jurisdiction, we now have further reports that clarify some of the earlier confusing reporting.  Apparently three lawsuits have been filed by the losing candidate's campaign so far, as previously reported.

           Two of those lawsuits were filed in State Court, not Federal Court, however.  One was filed in Georgia and the other was filed in Michigan.  Both have already been rejected by State Court Judges.

           The third and remaining lawsuit at this time was filed in Federal Court in Pennsylvania.  The announced purpose was to stop the counting of votes already cast.  The Federal Judge presiding over that case rejected that one, as well.  No word yet on the Federal Court's claim to jurisdiction, if any, over State Election Law.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

ARE PLAINTIFFS IN ELECTION CASES DEMANDING FEDERAL ACTIVISM, PREEMPTIVE JURISDICTION?

This article arises from the same common nucleus of operative facts, so to speak, out of which an earlier article published today also arises.

Recently filed elections cases have also caused me to wonder about Federal jurisdiction.

Are the plaintiffs in these elections cases asking Federal Judges to be activists and preempt the jurisdiction of State Courts over State Election Laws?  That seems to be the gist of the lawsuits I have seen reported to date.

There was a lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in Texas, in which the same person or group of people reportedly filed the same lawsuit they had already lost in the Texas Supreme Court.  Each time the lawsuit challenged the legality of drive-through voting in Harris County (Houston).

Isn't the issue of legality of drive-through voting a matter for the Texas State Courts to decide?

Parenthetically, I understand that the same person or group of people who lost their case in the Texas Supreme Court also lost their case in the U.S. District Court and then they lost again in the Federal Appellate Court.

Different people have filed their own lawsuits which are basically one lawsuit as well, but these people have filed in different States, all in Federal Court.  They have so far filed their lawsuit in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

The same losing candidate's campaign organization has reportedly filed three times, once in each of three Federal Courts.  It is confusing.  Apparently two of these same lawsuits were filed to stop counting votes and the third was filed for a re-count.

Isn't the issue of applying State Election Law an issue for State Court Judges to decide? 

I am going to look into the jurisdictional basis if any for asking Federal Courts to preemptively and actively exercise jurisdiction so as to impose their own views of local Election Law in these States.  As I wrote today in the earlier article also arising out of these developments, let's all of us keep an eye on the lawsuits being filed, and on who files them and who pays for them.

Assessing "bad faith" attorney's fees and sanctions, along with many situations requiring good faith and fair dealing, are discussed in § 2:7 in 1 Dennis J. Wall, Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith (3d ed. and 2020 Supps. Thomson Reuters West).  Attorney's fees awarded in a variety of cases are the subject of §§ 13:12 -13:14 in Volume 2, id.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

"BAD FAITH" ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPOSURE: LITIGIOUS PLAINTIFFS IN ELECTION CASES?

(Photograph Brennan Linsley / Associated Press)

Recently filed litigation has caused me to wonder about "bad faith" attorney's fees liability.  First, let me describe the lawsuits that have caused the wondering.

In Texas, the same person or group of people reportedly filed the same lawsuit more than once challenging the legality of drive-through voting in Harris County (Houston).  They filed in Texas State Court to begin with, ultimately losing at every level all the way to the Supreme Court of Texas, according to the confusing reporting.  Then they filed in a U.S. District Court in Texas and they lost there.  Then they filed an appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  My understanding is that they lost again there.

Other people have also filed their own "one-note" lawsuit but in different States, all in Federal Court.  In Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin there is a lawsuit filed in a Federal District Court in each state by the losing candidate.   The same losing candidate filed in each.  It is confusing, at least before looking more closely at each of these lawsuits, but apparently two are to stop counting votes and the third is for a re-count.  Presumably the votes have already been counted once before the recount litigation was filed, or else there could not be a "recount" yet, but as I say, the reports are confusing.

I want to temporarily put aside the question of Federal jurisdiction to adjudicate State election matters, and concentrate here on the issue of exposure to "bad faith" attorney's fees in Federal Court.

Having laid out the facts for the moment, here now is the law.  My understanding has long been that there can be exposure under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, under Federal Appellate Rules and under State Court equivalents for parties and their lawyers for bad faith in litigation.

Did the defendants and their lawyers even request attorney's fees in any of these cases for having to go through a "Groundhog Day" kind of litigation?

Parenthetically, if they did not request attorney's fees, did they request some kind of sanctions for this conduct?  I am not asking why the Courts did not assess attorney's fees or sanctions; I wonder if the defendants and their lawyers even asked for them.  Why should the defendants have to bear the full burden of their attorney's fees for repeatedly having to defend the same losing propositions?

I am going to look into this exposure in more detail.  In the interim, let's all of us keep an eye on the lawsuits being filed, and on who files them and who pays for them.

Assessing "bad faith" attorney's fees and sanctions, along with many situations requiring good faith and fair dealing, are discussed in § 2:7 in 1 Dennis J. Wall, Litigation and Prevention of Insurer Bad Faith (3d ed. and 2020 Supps. Thomson Reuters West).  Attorney's fees awarded in a variety of cases are the subject of §§ 13:12 -13:14 in Volume 2, id.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

THANK YOU FOR VOTING!

Many people never got the chance we have to vote.  But without them, our votes would not be possible.  We remember them and honor them every time we vote.

Thank you for being a voter.

 

Photo courtesy of Common Ground.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

 

THANK YOU FOR BEING A VOTER TOMORROW.

(Orlando 2020.  Photo ©Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.)

Tomorrow we get to exercise what many people have lived and died to protect for years in this country:  Our votes!

Thank you for being a voter.

Please read the disclaimer.  ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

MORE RESOURCES, MORE VOLUNTEER OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROTECTING THE VOTE!

And now a message from the Common Ground Project in Florida:  More resources, more volunteer opportunities for protecting the vote!

(Common Ground Project)

Defend Democracy:

Poll monitors needed!

Can we count on you?

The Common Ground Project is looking for volunteers to assist in our Poll Monitoring and Election Protection Program. This is a large statewide initiative led by our coalition partners: Common Cause, State Voices, and Florida for All. The Common Ground Project is committed to ensuring that all voters have safe and accessible access to casting their ballots and having their voices heard on November 3rd. We are in need of volunteers!

Please join us for this critical work to protect our election. We look forward to working with you as a leader in your community!

Please register to be a poll worker and sign up for one of the following upcoming training opportunities:

• Friday, October 30th at 6 PM
• Saturday, October 31st at 12 PM

As always, please do not hesitate to reach out if you have any questions!

Regards,

Lisa Perry

REGISTER

‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 

Please read the disclaimer.  This blog article ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

Tenants in Florida Disasters: How Do They Get Through?

(Image courtesy of NASA)

How Disasters Affect Residential Tenants and Mobile Home Tenants in Florida.  View this informative and useful Powerpoint presentation by Tom DiFiore, Housing Unit Leader at Bay Area Legal Services who is justifiably recognized as an expert in the field.

Download Candles in the Wind The Impacted Residential and Mobile Home Tenant

Please read the disclaimer.  This blog article ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

 

TRUST THE VOTE.

And now, a message from Election Protection.  Trust the Vote.

We care about the integrity of our elections and love when election officials quickly fix errors. Some politicians use these errors to make us feel that our votes won’t count. Do not let this affect our confidence in our system or our willingness to vote. #VoteReady.

Please read the disclaimer.  This blog article ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNOUNCES FINANCIAL INCENTIVE FOR LAWYERS ASSISTING VOTERS.

(American Bar Association)

In an email received this morning, the American Bar Association announced it is offering a financial incentive to lawyers who assist voters at this time.  Here is the ABA's announcement:

Volunteering at the polls is an important civic duty that lawyers are especially suited for given the profession's long tradition of civil service. This November, the ABA and MyCase are partnering to give ABA members who volunteer during the general election a $50 credit to ShopABA for their service. Whether you have already volunteered at your local polling place, or plan to volunteer on election day, November 3, you can earn a $50 credit towards books, webinars, CLE and other purchases in ShopABA.*

Register your service by November 6, 2020.

Please read the disclaimer.  This blog article ©2020 Dennis J. Wall.  All rights reserved.