Claims and Bad Faith Law Blog

When Judges Say They're "Afraid of Being Fired" For Rulings: A Postscript.

This is a postscript to an article posted here on October 3, 2019.

"With every decision, the judge has to weigh the risk of being fired against the oath of office he or she has taken.  And we have already seen the impact of this travesty with the 'Stay in Mexico' or the MPP program, where judges have confided that they have made rulings out of fear of losing their jobs."  Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, Judge of the Immigration Court and President of the National Association of Immigration Judges, the union of Immigration Judges, quoted by Catherine E. Shoichet, Immigration Judges Accuse Justice Department of Unfair Labor Practices, CNN Politics, posted online on Tuesday, September 27, 2019.

The "administration's so-called Migrant Protection Protocols [MPP] program" is the one "which forces some asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their cases make their way through the system[.]"  Id.

The background behind the headline of this report, that the Immigration Judges are accusing the justice department of Unfair Labor Practices, includes a few things.  For one, the department has called for the judges' union to be terminated.

The justice department has sent the judges anti-Semitic stories as a part of the briefing they send to these judges.

The department has also imposed "case competition quotas and the removal of [immigration judges'] power to administratively close cases."  Id.

When judges are afraid that their rulings will get them fired then perhaps unfair labor practices, while real issues, are the tips of a much larger iceberg.

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TOO MUCH SECRECY MAKES FALWELLS OF US ALL.

Jerry Falwell, Jr. and his wife were sued by a pool boy over their  investment in a gay youth hostel in Miami.  The pool boy complained that he was denied an "ownership stake" in the investment.  The incident was infamous.  There are more nefarious people involved than in any other incident this side of Washington, D.C.

There were reportedly arrangements for payments by Michael Cohen for "sexually compromising photographs involving the Falwells that could have been used as leverage against them."  Patricia Mazzei, Falwells Settle Court Case Over Florida Business Deal, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Tuesday, October 8, 2019, p. A15 (online here; the New York Times may charge for online access).

According to the linked reporting, Mr. Cohen denied making the payments.  The Falwells denied the business investment in which a pool boy would get a cut of the proceeds from a gay youth hostel.  Tom Arnold, estranged (or is it divorced?) husband of a well-known comedienne, reportedly made a "secret recording."

The pool boy sued the Falwells in Florida Circuit Court.  The Falwells removed that case to Federal District Court in the Southern District of Florida.  That was in the middle of September 2019.

Now, less than a month after that, Jerry Falwell, Jr. -- not the preacher, because this one is not ordained -- and his wife settled the pool boy's lawsuit.  Apparently the settlement agreement is totally under seal because the entire docket on the Southern District of Florida's website is literally blacked out, at least in response to repeated attempts to search it this morning on the Public Access to [Federal] Court Electronic Records or "PACER."

Repeated attempts to search the case on PACER this morning as well, yielded only the message:  "No records found."

There is no Order of Court on the docket sealing the contents.  So let's put this in a little context here.

Jerry Falwell, Jr. "is the chancellor of one of the nation's largest Christian colleges, Liberty University," id., and on behalf of Liberty he asks for donations and tuition money.

Mr. Falwell and his wife are clearly paying money in this settlement, or their insurance company is paying money in this settlement on their behalf, regardless of their denial of the pool boy's gay hostel investment allegations.

So why on earth can we not see the terms of this settlement agreement since Mr. Falwell is both asking for and apparently spending our money?  Why can we not see where our money is going, or even if our money is involved if we donate it to Mr. Falwell  or his Liberty?

Beyond those questions that arise because of Mr. Falwell's real involvements with money -- and not necessarily because of his denial of allegations of his other involvements with money -- there are very real questions of why and how his settlement apparently got sealed and blacked out under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Southern District's Local Rules?

And without even a record on the docket that a Federal Judge ordered the case sealed?   What is going on with the Southern District of Florida?

The case is Bello v. Falwell (Southern District of Florida Case No. 1:19-cv-23825-UU).

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When Judges Say "Afraid of Being Fired" For Their Rulings.

When people involved in lawsuits, including large corporations and individuals and children, cannot depend on getting a fair shake because the judge is afraid of ruling in their favor, that is the essence of bad faith.

There are reports right now that this is exactly what is happening in the current administration's immigration courts.

More than Sad. 

Bad Faith.

See Some Immigration Judges Say They Rule a Certain Way to Avoid Firing, by Mark Pattison, posted on CatholicPhilly.com on Monday, September 30, 2019.

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BAD FAITH IN PENNSYLVANIA MORTGAGE INSURANCE: 5,246 TIMES.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC sued Radian Guaranty Inc. Nationstar alleged claims "for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion and bad faith." The factual basis of these claims is succinctly stated at the beginning of the Court's opinion:

Nationstar contends that Radian denied, rescinded and curtailed mortgage insurance coverage and refused to reimburse Nationstar for premium overpayments on 5,246 residential home mortgage loans.

Nationstar Mort. LLC v. Radian Guar. Inc., No. 18-03798, 2019 WL 1318541, at *1 (E.D. Pa. March 22, 2019).

Radian challenged all of Nationstar's claims with a motion to dismiss. With respect to the alleged bad faith claim, the Pennsylvania federal court denied the motion to dismiss because the plaintiff alleged three groups of core facts to bring its claim within the Pennsylvania bad faith statute in this case:

    Nationstar contends that Radian acted in bad faith when it denied, rescinded, and curtailed coverage for valid claims and refused to reimburse Nationstar for premium overpayments.... Nationstar alleges that Radian knew and understood that if it wrongfully rescinded, denied and/or curtailed claims that third parties would seek to have Nationstar repurchase these loans..... Moreover, Nationstar’s Complaint is replete with allegations arguing that Radian lacked a reasonable basis for its coverage decisions.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Radian Guaranty Inc., 2019 WL 1318541, at *6. To regroup the core facts alleged by Nationstar Mortgage against Radian Guaranty in this case, first, Radian allegedly "denied, rescinded and curtailed" insurance coverage; second, Radian allegedly "refused to reimburse Nationstar for premium overpayments[,]" and third, Radian allegedly "knew and understood" that its actions disclaiming and discouraging coverage claims would have the effect of discouraging "third parties [who otherwise] would seek to have Nationstar repurchase these loans." On the basis of these alleged facts the Pennsylvania federal court refused to dismiss Nationstar Mortgage's bad faith claim against Radian Guaranty.

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EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRED TO CHALLENGE FLORIDA INSURANCE RATE.

In People's Trust MGA, LLC v. Pesta, ___ So. 3d ___, 2019 WL 4458813 (Fla. 4th DCA September 28, 2019), one of Florida's District Courts of Appeal held that failure to challenge rates or rating plans through the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation is jurisdictional.  In Florida, statutes exist which afford opportunities to challenge insurance rates that the Florida OIR is empowered to approve.

Failure to exhaust these administrative remedies deprives Florida trial courts of jurisdiction to entertain lawsuits which challenge insurance rates in Florida.   There was no need to address the federal filed rate doctrine in this Florida insurance case and so the Florida appellate court did not do so.

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FOOD STAMP PROGRAM IS ABOUT WHETHER PEOPLE HAVE ENOUGH TO EAT, ...

NOT WHETHER THEY WORK OR ARE CAPABLE OF WORKING.  OTHER PROGRAMS FOCUS ON THAT.  NOT THIS ONE.

Bad faith breach of fiduciary obligations occurs in many fields besides insurance.  Bad faith appears whenever individuals or organizations benefit themselves at the expense of others with powers delegated to the individual or organization in power for the benefit of others.  The proposed rules changes to the Food Stamp Program, now called "SNAP," are many things.  You can bet your summary judgment that there is no genuine issue but that these proposed rules changes are in bad faith.

Yesterday I sent the following Comments to the Secretary of Agriculture and a division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture that is ironically called the "Food and Nutrition Service." 

COMMENTS TO PROPOSED SNAP RULE REVISIONS.

Monday, September 23, 2019.

You published your Proposed SNAP rule revisions along with your commentary in the Federal Register, 84 F.R. 35570 - 33581. You wrote that you propose to redefine "benefits" from the Food and Nutrition Act written by Congress, and that you propose "to limit the types of non-cash TANF benefits conferring categorical eligibility to those that focus on subsidized employment, work supports and childcare." 84 F.R. at 35570.

 

1. Your first proposed change is to redefine "benefits" in the Food and Nutrition Act written by Congress.

You wrote that you wanted to redefine "benefits" for purposes of "categorical eligibility to mean ongoing and substantial benefits[.}" 84 F.R. at 35570. Your redefinition of "benefits" in your proposed rule change is invalid and unauthorized, and it is preempted by statutes enacted by Congress because it directly conflicts with the Food and Nutrition Act and the statutory provisions enacting the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) written by Congress.

    "Benefit" for purposes of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program "means the value of supplemental nutrition assistance provided to a household by means of" various sources described in 7 USCA § 2012 (d). There is no room in the statutory definition to add your alien concept of "ongoing and substantial benefits." If the statute needs amending, it is up to Congress to amend it, not you.

    You have no authority to redefine the "benefit" which Congress intended to address. Requiring the provision or receipt of "ongoing and substantial benefits" is simply not "other means of providing assistance, as determined by the Secretary," which is the only discretion you have been given in the Congressional definition of "benefit" in 7 USCA § 2012(d)(2).

    For all these reasons, your proposed rule is unreasonable.

    Your proposed rule is also unreasonable because it does not address the problem you lay out for your proposed rule in 84 F.R. at 35570, which you say is that "categorical eligibility for SNAP [can] be conferred on households based on receipt of minimal benefits issued by TANF-funded programs ...." If that is true and if that is your problem, then the "TANF-funded programs" of which you speak are the programs to be addressed, not the statutory definition of SNAP "benefits."

    Your proposed rule, again, is unreasonable because it does not address your problem with "TANF-funded programs which may not conduct a robust eligibility determination and do not meaningfully move families toward self-sufficiency." 84 F.R. at 35570. Your proposed rule does not even address any such "TANF-funded programs," even assuming that such programs may exist. Even if such programs exist, that they "may not conduct a robust eligibility determination" is not addressed by your proposed rule here.

    You do not provide any evidence at all -- and I am not aware that any evidence exists but it is not my burden to produce such evidence, the burden is yours and you have not met it -- that your proposed rule will somehow "ensure that TANF-funded programs conferring categorical eligibility align more closely with SNAP eligibility standards outlined in the Food and Nutrition Act." 84 F.R. at 35572.

    Further, whether such programs may or may not "conduct a robust eligibility determination," back to 84 F.R. at 35570, is a policy consideration that was already addressed by Congress when it implemented SNAP as a program of block grants to the States. If you are unhappy with how the States are directing their grant money under this program, you should address them and not redefine "benefits" instead. Parenthetically, your stated "determination" that your proposed rule "does not have federalism implications" is obviously hooey, in other words, it is false.

 

2. Your proposed rule would increase hunger and poverty in the United States "because," as you say, "more elderly individuals may not otherwise meet the SNAP eligibility requirements." 84 F.R. at 35576. For those additional reasons, your proposed rule is not reasonable.

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is about whether people have enough to eat, not whether they are working or capable of working. Congress set out the purpose of SNAP in 7 USCA § 2013(a). Under that statute, the Secretary is authorized by Congress to run "a supplemental assistance program under which, at the request of the State agency, eligible households within the State shall be provided an opportunity to obtain a more nutritious diet through the issuance to them of an allotment[.]"

    Your second announced proposed rule change, which is "to limit the types of non-cash TANF benefits conferring categorical eligibility to those that focus on subsidized employment, work supports and childcare" 84 F.R. at 35570, is unreasonable under SNAP for many reasons.

    Eligibility for SNAP has never involved "subsidized employment, work supports and childcare" so that people including parents can work. Other federal programs and other federal statutes and, yes, rules address your expressed concerns with "subsidized employment, work supports and childcare." Your proposed rule is not authorized by SNAP, and once again your proposed rule is also contrary to the Congressional purpose and statutes.    

    Your commentary in the Federal Register is replete with seemingly uncountable references to people who receive SNAP going out and getting a job -- regardless of whether the people who apply for SNAP are too old or too infirm to be capable of working. Those sentiments are inconsistent with the purpose of SNAP which, to say again, is about whether people have enough to eat. It was not the purpose of Congress in enacting SNAP to focus on whether people are working or capable of work because other statutes deal with work requirements while this statute focuses on the issue of people getting enough to eat.

    Your concern in the end with jobs and work supports "that support family self-sufficiency" 84 F.R. at 35572, and "that support meaningful work opportunities ... that help move families from welfare to self-sufficiency" 84 F.R. at 35573 and see 84 F.R. at 35574, is not the concern of SNAP. Your concerns are better expressed in the context of TANF, then, and should be directed there if at all. Your proposed rule is unreasonable under SNAP.

    And your proposed rule is discriminatory against the elderly. You admit as much when you write "that there is a potential for civil rights impacts to result" if your proposed rule is implemented "because more elderly individuals may not otherwise meet the SNAP eligibility requirements." 84 F.R. at 355776.

    Discrimination is not a reasonable result.

    Parenthetically, did you mean that "more" elderly people will be affected than not, or that "more" elderly people will not be able to receive SNAP allotments because of the new SNAP eligibility requirements under your proposed rule and, if that is what you meant, then what other rules exist, aside from your proposed rule, which in your mind would also prevent elderly people from receiving SNAP allotments? You can see that your language is confusing and it is hard to argue that confusing language leads to reasonable results in any case.

3. SNAP is a program of block grants from your Federal government to the States, as previously noted. The additional requirements which your proposed rule would impose upon the States are unreasonable and in any event you are not authorized to be the one to impose new requirements upon the States.

You admit that "[u]nder the proposed rule, a State would be required to inform FNS [the USDA Food and Nutrition Service] of all non-cash TANF benefits that confer categorical eligibility." 84 F.R. at 35574 - 35575. You call this new requirement that you impose a "notification requirement," and you say that it "would not unduly burden most State agencies," which makes it okay, you say. 84 F.R. at 35575.

    Yet, you claim that you "considered" whether your proposed rule has federalism implications and you also claim that you "determined" that there are no federalism implications here. To use a good old word that completely describes what you are saying, that's hooey, in other words, that's false. And unreasonable.

 

4. Conclusion.

For all these reasons, whether taken separately or together, your proposed rule is unreasonable under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program statutes enacted by Congress. Your proposed rule should be withdrawn and rewritten before it is implemented, if ever. If it is implemented it should be struck down.

    Thank you for your consideration.

Download COMMENTS TO PROPOSED SNAP RULE REVISIONS. 092319.  

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REPORTS OF THE DEATH OF CALIFORNIA EMISSIONS STANDARDS ARE PREMATURE.

Newspaper reporters write that the people currently in charge of the federal government are also in charge of California, at least when it comes to automobile pollution. Newspaper headlines blare that the current regime is going to "scrap" or "revoke" (New York Times, which may charge for online access) or "pull" or "end" (Associated Press) California's regulations related to car emissions.

This did not seem right. So I checked it out. I originally began with the concept that perhaps granting waivers from federal pollution standards might be discretionary with the EPA Administrator.

That could have explained these stories and these headlines. Discretion must ordinarily be exercised in good faith so it seemed that this issue may be a good fit with this blog which is about bad faith and good faith. What I found in 45 minutes of research was enlightening. And reassuring.

The Federal Clean Air Act is a statute. Statutes can be changed only by Congress.

So that puts the idea to rest right away of any federal government agencies trying to "scrap" and "pull" any State's laws or regulations. To my knowledge, Congress has not acted to change the Clean Air Act to bar California or any other State from writing regulations that require more protections on automobile emission levels than those who currently occupy the federal government would require.

The Administrator of the Federal Environmental Agency cannot act on her or his own to "scrap" or "pull" California laws or regulations. The EPA Administrator is statutorily authorized to prescribe regulations and standards for automobile emissions. 42 USCA § 7521(a)(2). But the statute allows for differences in regulations and standards. For example, even a motor vehicle manufacturer -- not just a State -- can certify that changes to vehicles will not result in failure to comply with standards promulgated by the EPA Administrator. 42 USCA § 7541(a)(2).

More important, the Administrator "shall" grant a waiver of the federal standards "if the State determines" that the State standards will be "at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable federal standards." 42 USCA § 7543(b)(1) (emphasis added).

This is mandatory language. It directs the EPA Administrator when and where to grant waivers under the Clean Air Act. It leaves it to the States to determine whether State standards comply and, once that determination is made by the State then the federal official -- the EPA Administrator -- has no discretion but to grant the waiver. The Administrator shall grant a waiver of the federal standards if the State determines that the State standards comply with the Clean Air Act. If the EPA Administrator has no discretion to deny waivers, then the EPA Administrator has no discretion to rescind waivers that have already been given.

Case closed as they say.

Yet there's more. Other States that adopt emissions standards that follow California emissions standards for which a waiver has been granted are automatically qualified for waiver status under the Clean Air Act. 42 USCA § 7507.

Moreover, any person can file a civil action against the Administrator "where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary," 42 USCA § 7604(a)(2) (emphasis added), so that it seems clear that not only does the EPA Administrator not have any discretion to decline -- or rescind -- any waivers but anyone in America can sue if the Administrator fails to grant or uphold waivers for State standards that are at least as stringent as the Clean Air Act would require.

To rephrase a quote from Mark Twain, the reports of the death of California's emission standards are premature.

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FACEBOOK, MEET THY CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA MATCH. Part Two.

The first of two articles about the same case discussed below, was posted here on September 12, 2019. This is the second article on the subject of the invasion of privacy Multi-District Litigation against Facebook pending in the Northern District of California at this time.

In what appears to be a direct rebuke of one of the Roberts Court's decisions, a Federal District Judge ruled that a class of plaintiffs can sue a company for invasion of privacy because invasion of privacy is both "concrete" and "particularized" enough to sustain a claim. This ruling came despite the District Judge's recognition that the claims alleged against Facebook in this federal lawsuit involve "an intangible privacy injury[.]" In re: Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, MDL No. 2843, No. 18-md-02843-VC, 2019 WL 4261048, at *9 (N.D. Cal. September 9, 2019) (Chhabria, USDJ).

"This lawsuit, which stems from the Cambridge Analytica scandal, is about Facebook's practice of sharing its users' personal information with third parties." In re: Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *1.

It will be useful to recall the specific allegations in the operative complaint.  Although they were detailed in the first article posted here about this case, for readers' convenience and at risk of seeming repetitive, the specific allegations against Facebook in this case will be repeated in the present article. The plaintiffs alleged four categories of actionable conduct:

The plaintiffs allege that Facebook violated their privacy rights (and other rights) because: (i) they engaged in sensitive communications that included photographs, videos they made, videos they watched, Facebook posts, likes, and private one-on-one messages; (ii) they intended to share these communications only with a particular person or a group of people; (iii) Facebook made those communications widely available to third parties in a variety of ways; and (iv) as a result, third parties were able to develop detailed dossiers on the plaintiffs including information about their locations, their religious and political preferences, their video-watching habits, and other sensitive matters.

In re Facebook Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *9.

In the face of these allegations, Facebook filed a motion to dismiss based on several grounds, one of which we will address in the present article. Facebook advocated that the invasion of privacy lawsuit against it should be dismissed by this federal court because, Facebook argued, "that even if its users had a privacy interest in the information they made available only to friends, there is no standing to sue in federal court because there were no tangible negative consequences from the dissemination of this information."

In this case, the District Court denied Facebook's motion to dismiss and rejected Facebook's standing argument in particular: "That too is wrong." The Federal District Judge explained that "the law has long recognized that a privacy invasion is itself the kind of injury that can be redressed in federal court, even if the invasion does not lead to some secondary economic injury like identity theft." In re: Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *1.

The ruling in this case began with the U.S. Supreme Court's standing requirements, which have come to be known as the Spokeo "injury in fact" requirement. Simply put, the Spokeo decision found a requirement in the U.S. Constitution that a plaintiff in a lawsuit in federal court must allege an actual or concrete injury in order to have a constitutionally required "case or controversy" that a federal court can adjudicate.

The ruling began by pronouncing Spokeo to be "black-letter law[.]" After bowing to the supremacy of the Supreme Court, the District Court proceeded to quote the Supreme Court's Spokeo decision to reject the argument in this particular case that an injury must not only be "concrete" and "particularized," but the alleged injury must always be "tangible," too:

But it’s black-letter law that an injury need not be “tangible” to be cognizable in federal court. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (“Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”). And courts have often held that this particular type of intangible injury – disclosure of sensitive private information, even without further consequence – gives rise to Article III standing.

In re: Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *8.

After establishing that at least some so-called intangible injuries can constitutionally be redressed in federal courts, the District Court addressed the twin Spokeo requirements that the alleged injuries be both "concrete" and "particularized."

The injury alleged in this case "is 'concrete' largely for the reasons already discussed," namely, if you use a company's social media platform to share your sensitive information only with your friends, "then you suffer a concrete injury when the company disseminates that information widely."

The alleged injury was "particularized, at least for some of the plaintiffs," because it was allegedly suffered "directly by the individual plaintiff" and was different from the generalized injury "that members of the public at large might have to a defendant's unlawful conduct." In re: Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *9.

"Accordingly, for all the claims addressed by this ruling, Facebook cannot obtain dismissal for lack of Article III standing." In re: Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *10.

Whether and for how long this ruling will survive scrutiny by the Spokeo Court, remains to be seen. For now, this wise ruling is the law that governs at least one company.

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FACEBOOK, MEET THY CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA MATCH. Part One.

Facebook has been sued for invasion of privacy.  The plaintiffs' allegations "stem[] from the Cambridge Analytica scandal," and their alleged class action "is about Facebook's practice of sharing its users' personal information with third parties."  In re:  Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, MDL No. 2843, No. 18-md-02843-VC, 2019 WL 4261048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. September 9, 2019) (Chhabria, USDJ).

In particular, the plaintiffs suing Facebook over the infamous Cambridge Analytica scandal and asserting claims over Facebook's reported business model of selling its customers' personal information to third parties, allege four groups of actionable conduct:

The plaintiffs allege that Facebook violated their privacy rights (and other rights) because: (i) they engaged in sensitive communications that included photographs, videos they made, videos they watched, Facebook posts, likes, and private one-on-one messages; (ii) they intended to share these communications only with a particular person or a group of people; (iii) Facebook made those communications widely available to third parties in a variety of ways; and (iv) as a result, third parties were able to develop detailed dossiers on the plaintiffs including information about their locations, their religious and political preferences, their video-watching habits, and other sensitive matters.

In re Facebook Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *9.

In the face of these allegations, Facebook filed a motion to dismiss based on three grounds.  We discuss the first of those grounds here. "First, Facebook argues that people have no legitimate privacy interest in any information they make available to their friends on social media."   In re Facebook Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *1.

Facebook's first argument is simply that they cannot be sued here.  Facebook filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit -- a lawsuit, recall, that was a result of the Cambridge Analytica revelations about Facebook's reported business practices of selling sensitive information of their customers -- by saying that they, Facebook, simply cannot be sued for what they allegedly did.

The Court's concise rejection of this first Facebook argument is already well-known, that "Facebook's argument could not be more wrong."  

The Court explained why at the outset of its opinion, in a concise and compelling summary followed by the written opinion in this ruling:

When you share sensitive information with a limited audience (especially when you’ve made clear that you intend your audience to be limited), you retain privacy rights and can sue someone for violating them.

In re Facebook Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 2019 WL 4261048, at *1.

Facebook's second argument that it should not be sued in this case is that the plaintiffs did not allege any "concrete" and "particularized" injury, so that even if the plaintiffs suffered an injury otherwise recognized by the law, still they could not sue here in this federal court case because they arguably lacked standing to sue Facebook.  In the next article, we will address that argument and the Court's disposition of it.

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STATE FILED RATE DOCTRINES BELONG TO THE STATES, NOT FEDS.

In Castillo v. Johnson, No. CV-17-04688-PHX-DRY, 2019 WL 4222289, at *1 (D. Ariz. September 5, 2019), a group that the federal judge called "the Bribery Defendants" were sued for racketeering, unjust enrichment, and "conspiring to unlawfully raise utility rates through racketeering, wire fraud, and bribery of a public servant."

In response to these claims, the Bribery Defendants actually alleged that bribing them was immunized by the Filed Rate Doctrine! In other words, the utility rates in question were allegedly subject to approval by an authorized administrative agency, they argued. That meant, according to them, that there could be no claim against them even if they took bribes to charge the approved utility rates.

Well, the long and the short of it is that the federal judge rejected the Bribery Defendants' argument in this case. First, the Federal Filed Rate Doctrine just could not apply in this case. "Because no federal rate is implicated here, the federal filed rate doctrine is inapplicable." Castillo, 2019 WL 4222289, at *3.

Second, whether or not Arizona has its own filed rate doctrine, and whether or not it would apply here anyway, the relevant Arizona administrative authority had already expressly rejected the idea that utility rates in Arizona can be obtained by bribery:

The Court is unpersuaded that Arizona has adopted a version of the filed rate doctrine. Nor is the Court persuaded that the doctrine, assuming one has been adopted, would apply to the type of conduct at issue here. Nevertheless, even assuming that Arizona has adopted a filed rate doctrine and that it applies under these circumstances, the doctrine does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims because the [Arizona Corporation] Commission repudiated the doctrine in this instance. The Court therefore denies the Bribery Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Castillo, 2019 WL 4222289, at *8. The federal court's three-part analysis of state filed rate doctrine is instructive. First, the court looked to whether the forum state has adopted a version of the filed rate doctrine. In the course of its opinion, the federal court cautioned that this first question cannot be answered simply by resorting to federal filed rate precepts.

Second, the federal court looked to see whether a state filed rate doctrine could be applied on the merits. Even assuming that a state filed rate doctrine could apply to these facts -- after showing that the facts of this case could not support any filed rate doctrine here -- the federal court turned to the last of the trio of questions.

Third and finally, the relevant state administrative agency had already taken action that "repudiated the doctrine in this instance." Simply put, no filed rate doctrine can ever be applied in the face of state administrative agency action that repudiates it in the case at bar.

Those federal litigants and judges who have ears to hear, including in other Circuits that have ruled to the contrary based upon federal and not state filed rate doctrine rules, let them hear the voices of the states about their own filed rate doctrines.

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"IT'S THE QUOTA, STUPID."

Some policies of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may appear to be puzzling at first glance, until you suspect the common denominator hidden among them.  These puzzling policies include denying automatic citizenship to the children of soldiers, sailors, marines and fliers "born abroad to active service members[.]"  Until recently, it was the policy of the United States government that the children of active military personnel serving outside of the United States were automatically citizens of the U.S.A.  They were automatically U.S. citizens every bit as much as if they had been born within the U.S. borders.  However the latest Acting Director of the USCIS, Mr. Kenneth Cuccinelli, backed out of that policy.  See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Scrutiny Over Scope, and Purpose, of Citizenship Policy, NEW YORK TIMES, Friday, August 30, 2019, p. A18 (the New York Times may charge for online access).

Those puzzling policies also include suddenly refusing permission for children already permitted to receive medical care in the United States, because they are in danger of death without it, to remain in the United States.  Even though deporting them means sending them to their deaths.  See Miriam Jordan and Caitlin Dickerson, Sick Migrants Undergoing Lifesaving Care Can Now Be Deported, NEW YORK TIMES, Friday, August 30, 2019, p. A19.  This too is a change in policy instituted by Mr. Cuccinelli (a/k/a "the Cooch") (it bears repeating:  the New York Times may charge for online access).

But the motivation behind all these policy changes ordered by Kenneth Cuccinelli is almost certainly the same:  A quota.  A quota like the quota supposedly imposed on police officers to hand out tickets.  Whether true or not, that quota always surfaces about police officers (and police officers almost always deny it).  Except in this case it's a quota of reducing the number of people who are in the United States -- or who would be, absent these changes in policy -- other than people who were born here.

So, reporters and journalists trying to cover this story, look for tell-tale signs of quota enforcement:  things like bonuses, promotions, salary increases, and gifts like trips and such, provided by USCIS or any other agency of the current regime to any federal employee who reduces the number of people in the United States who were not born here in the first place.

That may be only the beginning.

P.S. on Tuesday, September 3, 2019:

After reports like the ones linked above were published, USCIS enigmatically announced that they "may" be looking at their deferred medical exemptions policy changes.  Nobody can tell what that means.  See for yourself:  See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Administration to Reconsider Deportation of Seriously Ill / Program Allowing Care Had Been Eliminated, NEW YORK TIMES, Tuesday, September 3, 2019 (readers be aware:  the New York Times may charge for online access); Priscilla Alvarez, Immigration Agency to Re-Open Some Requests to Defer Deportation, CNN.com posted Monday, September 2, 2019.   Still no word, unfortunately, about the current regime's quota system.  And no word, either, in these articles about Mr. Ken Cuccinelli's hand in these changes in U.S. government policy.

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This article was written before Hurricane Dorian could inflict damage including to the power supply. It has been previously posted for today.

Pre-Dorian Damage Report: FLORIDA "DISINTERESTED APPRAISER."

It has been held that in Florida a "disinterested appraiser" under an insurance contract using that term does not include either "the insureds' agent/public adjuster." See State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, No. 3D19-927, 2019 WL 3309217, at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA July 24, 2019).

The Florida appellate court actually had to quash a Florida trial judge's order in this case "allowing the insureds' agent/public adjuster to act as their 'disinterested' appraiser." Sanders, 2019 WL 3309217, at *1. Florida is one of the few jurisdictions where there could have been any doubt about that.

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This article was written for posting at this time before Hurricane Dorian inflicted any damage on Florida.

CHALLENGING CFPB's PROPOSED NEW RULE 11.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has proposed a new "Rule 11," in its proposed new rule at 12 CFR 100618(g).  Supposedly the new rule is intended to affect debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

CFPB's proposed new rule is not authorized by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act or otherwise. The proposed new Section 100618(g) regulates attorneys and not debt collectors.

The proposed rule provides immunity to debt collection attorneys, which the CFPB is not authorized to do. It does not "prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined[.]" The proposed new rule relies on defining "meaningful attorney involvement case law," but that interpretation is up to judges to decide, and not to the CFPB.

Further, the CFPB's proposed new "Rule 11" in new 12 CFR 100618(g) omits relevant and important safeguards on attorney conduct prescribed by Rule 11 for all forms of attorney conduct in litigation of any kind in federal courts.

These are just some of the problems raised by this new "Rule 11."

Download CHALLENGING CFPB PROPOSED RULE 11 NEW CFR 100618(g).08.19.19.

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MORE ON "COMPUTER MODELLING MAKES FOOLS OF US ALL."

For years I have been writing about the use of computer modelling to predict damages from hurricanes. No, not simply using computers to predict hurricanes, but using computers to predict and process damages claims from hurricanes without investigating and evaluating the claims that are actually made after a hurricane has passed through.

Perhaps the approach of Hurricane Dorian is on my mind. We are sitting in the middle of its latest predicted path. We will know shortly if that prediction holds.

Courts have begun to address the use of computer models to predict and process other types of damages claims and found it to be an actionable abuse of computer models. In a recent case, a State court certified a class of GEICO policyholders who alleged that GEICO filtered their PIP claims through computer models instead of investigating and evaluating their PIP claims based on investigation. The case is Green v. GEICO General Ins. Co., No.: N17C-03-242 EMD CCLD, 2019 WL 4039609 (Del. Super. Ct. August 27, 2019) (stated UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING).

Computer modelling makes fools of us all: Predicting damages using computer models instead of paying adjusters to adjust claims is not just a continuing practice. It has actually expanded, for example, from hurricanes to PIP injuries, as in this case.

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THE SHAME OF THE UNBALANCED BUDGET.

Trump Administration Will Divert Disaster Relief Funds to U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement, Prompting Outcry From Democrats, WASHINGTON POST online Tuesday, August 27, 2019.

This is what comes of not putting limitations on your budget vote.

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Download 08.29.19.

 

TWO FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE BOOKS OF BUSINESS.

Two recently published articles will appeal to everyone concerned with insurance policy interpretation and to insurance coverage lawyers in particular. One article addresses general principles that apply to all insurance coverage cases. The other addresses a specialized niche. Both are available on Westlaw.

The first is by the estimable Kenneth S. Abraham, and the title of the article is self-explanatory. It will find a ready audience among insurance coverage lawyers generally: Plain Meaning, Extrinsic Evidence, and Ambiguity: Myth and Reality in Insurance Policy Interpretation, 25 CONN. INS. L.J. 329 (Spring 2019).

The other is addressed to a specialized niche of insurance coverage issues involving many insurance policies, many parties, and likely a lot of corporate money at stake. It is by James M. Fischer, Understanding the "Exhaustion of Coverage" Doctrine in the Context of Continuous Trigger Coverage, 25 CONN. INS. L.J. 263 (Spring 2019).

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PRIVATELY FUNDED PROTECTIVE ORDERS ARE THE LAW OF THE CASE.

The following language is typical. The following case is typical. That is not to say that either one is good or bad. It is to say that it is typical, meaning only that it is the way things are done more often than not:

    On July 2, 2018, the parties filed a stipulated protective order, which was entered by the court on July 11, 2018. [Docket Nos. 27 (“Protective Order”), 28.] The Protective Order permits the parties to designate certain materials produced during discovery as confidential in order to prevent their public disclosure. It states that a party “may challenge a designation of confidentiality at any time,” by initiating a dispute resolution process and “providing written notice of each designation it is challenging and describing the basis for each challenge.” Protective Order ¶¶ 6.1, 6.2. The Protective Order also states that if the parties cannot resolve a challenge through the meet and confer process, the designating party must file and serve a motion to retain confidentiality. Id. ¶ 6.3.

Economus v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 18-cv-01071-HSG (DMR), 2019 WL 3842008, at *1 (N.D. Cal. August 15, 2019) (Ryu, USMJ).

After an exhaustive review of many factors that the Magistrate Judge wrote should be taken into account in any secrecy equation in the Ninth Circuit, the Magistrate Judge in this case granted the defendants' motion to retain confidentiality of certain documents. The defendants in the case had marked the documents confidential under the Stipulated Protective Order even as they were submitted as part of the reason for the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

In other words, the defendants submitted evidence which they argued was in favor of their summary judgment, and which they also marked "confidential" and so not available to the public to see.

Seven pages later, the Magistrate Judge announced a ruling to keep the materials under seal because the plaintiff did not follow the Stipulated Protective Order to challenge the defendants' confidentiality designations:

    As Economus did not properly challenge the confidentiality designation of these documents pursuant to the terms of the Protective Order, that issue is not presently before the court. Accordingly, the court declines to lift the confidentiality designations on those documents.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court grants Defendants’ motion to retain confidentiality. The documents identified by Bates numbers CCSF_ECONOMUS 000837-841, 00117, and 002262-2267 shall remain confidential pursuant to the terms of the Protective Order entered in this case.

Economus, 2019 WL 3842008, at *8.

In other words, the plaintiff Economus did not follow the Stipulated Protective Order in this case, the defendants did, and so the evidence marked "confidential" by the defendants and filed under seal had to remain under seal.

Do you think that the real issue was whether either party followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in particular Rule 26?

Not now, not in this typical case. Parties are urged to follow not only the actual Rules of Civil Procedure in most federal courts but also to follow the terms of any Stipulated Protective Order which they have filed in their particular case -- just in case of a decision like this whether in the Ninth Circuit or not.

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BAD FAITH BEGINS WHEN THE NOTICE IS ELECTRONICALLY FILED.

A panel of Florida's Second District Court of Appeal, an intermediate appellate court, recently resolved the question: When does the statutory cure period of 60 days begin under Florida's so-called "Bad Faith Statute," Fla. Stat. § 624.155?

The statutory cure period is the period during which the accused carrier can "cure" the bad faith alleged in a Civil Remedy Notice filed under the statute. That makes the start-time question a big deal especially for carriers who want all the time they can get to cure the alleged bad faith -- and so not be sued under Florida's statute.

The appellate court held that the time starts when the Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) is electronically filed with the Department of Financial Services which houses the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, i.e., the Florida Insurance Commissioner:

Therefore, we hold that the sixty-day cure period under section 624.155 begins when the CRN is electronically filed with the Department, and to avoid a bad faith action, the insurer must pay the claim or take corrective action within sixty days from the date the CRN is electronically filed.

Harper v. GEICO General Ins. Co., 272 So. 3d 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (page numbers unavailable at time of this publication).

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A PLEASANT SURPRISE FROM S.D. FLA.

A U.S. Magistrate Judge's opinion in a case in the Southern District of Florida is as worthwhile quoting as it is surprising. As one of many reasons, the Magistrate Judge ordered discovery of a settlement agreement entered into between the plaintiffs and a couple of the defendants in a case involving other defendants.

The Magistrate Judge wrote:

    In addition to the findings and analysis made previously in this Order, the Court additionally finds as follows. First, merely because settling parties label a settlement agreement as “confidential” and agree to confidentiality terms amongst themselves, does not mean that a federal court cannot order such settlement agreement produced in discovery if it is relevant and proportional under Rule 26(b)(1). “There is nothing magical about a settlement agreement.” Jen Weld Inc. [v. Nebula Glass Int'l, Inc.], 2007 WL 1526649 at *3 [(S.D. Fla. May 22, 2007)]. Secrecy is disfavored in our federal courts. Parties cannot insulate a document from discovery merely because they decide to label it as confidential; the federal courts are to decide such issue, not the parties.

Kadiyala, individually, and as assignee of Credit Union Mortgage Utility Banc, Inc. v. Pupke, No. 17-80732-CIV-Marra/Matthewman, 2019 WL 3752654, at *4 (S.D. Fla. August 8, 2019) (Matthewman, U.S.M.J.) (emphasis added).

It sounds like the presumption of public access may be alive and well in this case.

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COVERAGE FOR EL PASO AND DAYTON CARNAGE.

There may be coverage for the terrorism-produced carnage in El Paso and Dayton under a recent ruling in a bad faith and coverage case by a federal appeals court. In Universal Cable Prod's, LLC v. Atlantic Spec. Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019), the federal appellate court held that covered terrorism under an insurance policy was not excluded by a "war actions" exclusion.  The appellate court remanded to the trial court for proceedings on the coverage claims and on the bad faith claims at bar.

More precisely as to the main coverage issue, the court held that an organization known for its violence was not a sovereign state the warlike actions of which would be excluded under an exclusion for "'warlike action by a military force' by a 'government, sovereign, or other authority.'” Instead the terrorist's actions were covered terrorism under the liability insurance policy at bar.

The appellate court applied California law to interpret the insurance policy at issue but relied on federal decisions from New York to reach this ruling. As California and New York go, so goes the coverage nation?

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HELL IN A HELOC.

Dolores Zirbser and Bruce Jon Spalla made a loan agreement for a home equity line of credit ("HELOC"). The loan originated with Wachovia Bank. Wachovia sold the loan to Wells Fargo.

Zirbser and Spalla sued Wells Fargo in December 2018 over billing them for allegedly "erroneous fees" and taking other payments that were not authorized by the loan contract. Wells successfully argued for dismissal of five of the six counts of the complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations, i.e., that the allegedly "illegal charges" were time-barred because they took place too long ago to sue on now.

Except for three charges that were within the time to sue on them. The federal judge denied Wells's motion to dismiss the last remaining count, which is alleged for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law. In New Jersey,

[t]o show a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must show “(1) the defendant act[ed] in bad faith or with a malicious motive, (2) to deny the plaintiff some benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties, even if that benefit was not an express provision of the contract.” [Citation omitted.] Proof of a party’s “bad motive” or “intention” must support a claim of breach of contract grounded on an alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Zirbser v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.: 19-cv-01099-RBK-KMW, 2019 WL 3244621, at *4 (D.N.J. July 19, 2019).

In this case, the federal judge held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged a breach of the good faith covenant that was implied in their loan agreement as to those unauthorized charges that were not excluded by the statute of limitations:

... Plaintiffs sufficiently allege bad faith because they state that the Defendant knowingly charged them for three fees outside the express terms of the contract. (Compl. at ¶¶ 21–22.) Defendant did so intentionally and therefore acted “in bad faith, dishonestly, or with improper motive” and “destroy[ed] or injure[d] the right of the [Plaintiffs] to receive the benefits or reasonable expectations of the contract.” (Id. at ¶ 129). Taking all inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs were denied the benefit of their bargain because they contracted to pay for only those fees permitted by the agreement, not any others. (Id.)

Zirbser v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.: 19-cv-01099-RBK-KMW, 2019 WL 3244621, at *4 (D.N.J. July 19, 2019).

Alleged bad faith in a HELOC. If proven, that means hell in a HELOC. So wait for it: This case will settle now.

Download IBF 08.06.19.

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INSURANCE BAD FAITH LAW APPLIED TO WORKER’S COMPENSATION CLAIM.

In Ball v. Federal Ins. Co., 4:18-CV-04008-KES, 2019 WL 3393166 (D.S.D. July 26, 2019), the federal court applied a merger of insurance bad faith law with the handling of a worker’s compensation claim:

    The first element of a bad faith claim requires an absence of a reasonable basis for denying the benefits of the policy. Hein, [2007 S.D. 40, 731 N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 2007], 731 N.W.2d at 236 (citing Champion, [399 N.W.2d 320 (S.D. 1987)], 399 N.W.2d at 324). “Insurers are entitled to challenge fairly debatable claims.” Id. at 237 (citing Zuke, [1999 S.D. 31, 589 N.W.2d 925 (S.D. 1999)], 589 N.W.2d at 930). “Because any injury in a workers’ compensation bad faith claim stems from the insurer’s denial, not the insurer’s conduct alone, a central element of the cause of action is whether there has been a wrongful denial of benefits.” Id. (citing Champion, 399 N.W.2d at 324).

Ball v. Federal Ins. Co., 4:18-CV-04008-KES, 2019 WL 3393166, at *4 (D.S.D. July 26, 2019). The federal court ultimately denied the worker’s compensation carrier’s motion for summary judgment in that case.

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HOW WE GOT TO SEE THE OPIOID DATABASE, Continued.

Part two of two.

It was a near thing. We got to see the opioid database because two judges voted for us to see it. They also voted for us to see the documents related to it.

In a 2-to-1 decision, the majority on a panel of the Sixth Circuit held that the trial judge’s decision to conceal the opioid information was “bizarre” and “irrational.” In re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, 927 F.3d 919, 932 (6th Cir. 2019). The trial judge previously ruled simultaneously that keeping the opioid information secret was not important and also that it was important to keep the opioid documents – and the opioid database – secret.

Corporate media accounts have generally been outstanding in their reporting on this issue but many nonetheless seem to say, erroneously, that the trial judge’s ruling in this litigation made the opioid database and the documents available to the public. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Katie Thomas and Danny Hakim, 3,271 Pill Bottles, a Town of 2,831: Court Filings Say Corporations Fed Opioid Epidemic, NEW YORK TIMES, Saturday, July 20, 2019, p. A1 (online July 19, 2019; the New York Times may charge to view online). The District judge in this case has been shown in something of a favorable light in the corporate media generally, and generally deservedly so. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Groundwork is Laid For Opioids Settlement That Would Touch Every Corner of U.S., NEW YORK TIMES online June 14, 2019 (New York Times may charge for online access).

However, in this case the trial judge did not make the database or the documents available to the public. To the contrary, the trial judge ruled to make the opioid documents and the opioid database unavailable to the public.

It was the Sixth Circuit panel of appellate judges that ruled in favor of the importance of public access guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Actually, the ruling was made by two of those judges. Their names? Eric L. Clay, who wrote the opinion, and Robert A. Griffin, who concurred in the opinion completely.

To say again, it was a near thing.

Download IBF 07.25.19.

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HOW WE GOT TO SEE THE HIDDEN OPIOID DATABASE.

Part one of two.

The people of the United States have only recently been allowed to see a database maintained with their money by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration. It is a database at the heart of the opioid epidemic in the United States.

The database tracks every last pain pill sold in the United States, from manufacturers to distributors to your local pharmacy where it is eventually sold to the people in every large city down to the smallest town. The Washington Post has broken down 380 million of these transactions between 2006 and 2012 into usable form. During that time 100,000 people reportedly died from opioid abuse.

Thanks to the Post’s breakdown, the information stored in the database is no longer secret or remote, but accessible. Americans can use the information stored in their database to see things like which pharmacies sold the most drugs and how much they sold. Our family has already done that search. Has yours? Here is a link to the Post’s portal into the people’s database which the people did not previously know they owned: Drilling Into the DEA’s Pain Pill Database, Washington Post online Updated Sunday, July 21, 2019.

The Washington Post’s work on making the database usable is exceptional. The Post has earned the American people’s gratitude, and the Post deserves it. However, the database and documents surrounding it would never have become known to the public if it had not been for two judges in Ohio.
This long but amazing story continues in our next article.

Download IBF 07.23.19.

 

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BAD FAITH CLAIMS DEPENDED ON EVIDENCE. ANYTHING LESS DIDN’T COUNT.

There are two types of insurer bad faith claims under Ohio law, the federal judge ruled in a case involving coverage and bad faith claims under an insurance policy for losses from fire. The case is Jordan v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., NO. 4:19CV0093, 2019 WL 3082304 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2019), and the judge’s ruling applies at least in a first-party case subject to Ohio law like this case:

There are two types of bad faith claims that can be asserted: (1) when the insurer had no lawful basis for its refusal of the claim or (2) when the insurer failed to determine whether there was a lawful basis for the refusal. [Citations omitted.] This principle would appear to remain intact even after Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552[, 644 N.E. 2d 397] (1994)[, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 56 (1995)], overruled the portions of these decisions inserting an intent element. [Citations omitted.] The first type involves the merits of the contract claim. Therefore, in this type of bad faith claim, the success of the tort claim hinges on the success of the contract claim. [Citations omitted.]

Jordan v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., NO. 4:19CV0093, 2019 WL 3082304, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2019).
The second type of bad faith claim recognized under Ohio law, according to the federal court in this case, is predicated on an insurance carrier’s failure to determine a legitimate basis to deny the claim before it denies the claim. “A bad faith claim based on failure to determine whether there was a lawful basis to deny coverage is not tied to the underlying merits of the decision to grant or deny coverage.” Jordan v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., NO. 4:19CV0093, 2019 WL 3082304, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2019).
The federal court ruled that the plaintiff’s allegations in this case triggered both types of bad faith claims. The court denied the carrier’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was based on an argument that the contractual limitations period was exceeded as a matter of law when applied to the allegations in the complaint in this particular case.
Evidence is necessary in this case, not judgment on the pleadings, the federal judge ruled.

Download IBF 07.18.19.
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HAMAS IS NOT AT WAR FOR INSURANCE, NINTH CIRCUIT SAYS.

“In late June and through July of 2014, Hamas fired rockets from Gaza into Israel. Because of these hostilities, the plaintiffs, Universal Cable Productions, LLC, and Northern Entertainment Productions, LLC (collectively “Universal”), moved the production of their television series Dig out of Jerusalem. Universal incurred significant expenses during this move and filed an insurance claim for coverage of those costs under a television production insurance policy (the “Policy”).” Universal Cable Prod’s, LLC v. Atlantic Spec. Ins. Co., No. 17-56672, 2019 WL 3049034, at *1 (9th Cir. July 12, 2019).

Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company is Universal’s carrier. It denied the claim on the basis of “war exclusions” in its policy. Atlantic Specialty Insurance acknowledged that the policy covered acts of terrorism, but argued that the actions of Hamas constituted acts of war and so the resulting losses embedded in Universal’s claim were excluded because the losses resulted from “war,” “warlike action by a military force,” or “insurrection, rebellion, [or] revolution.” Universal Cable Productions, 2019 WL 3049034, at *2.
Who says federal judges cannot make their own foreign policy? In this case, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Atlantic Specialty. These were not acts of “war,” the federal judges said. For “war” exclusions in an insurance policy to bar coverage, they said, they had to apply a specialized meaning that applies to insurance policies under California law, which they said governed this case. “Under that specialized meaning, both “war” and “warlike action by a military force” require hostilities between either de jure or de facto sovereigns, and Hamas constitutes neither.” Universal Cable Productions, 2019 WL 3049034, at *2.
The appellate panel reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the carrier on the coverage claim. It also reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on Universal’s bad faith claim because the trial court had applied the plain meaning of “war” to the carrier’s war exclusions in this case when, the appellate panel said, the trial court should have applied the specialized meaning of “war” instead.
Thus the Ninth Circuit made its own foreign policy. Who among us can see the farthest reach of federal judges’ powers.
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"MOST INELIGIBLES LIVE IN SMALL HOUSEHOLDS THAT COULD NOT EASILY SEPARATE."

HUD said that in 2019.

Tomorrow at the close of day, Tuesday, July 9, 2019, the Comment period will end for HUD to accept Comments to the proposed Mixed Status Families rules changes. The changes, proposed by Mr. Stephen Miller, are worth a look and so are the Comments.

Comments on proposed rules changes are easy to make. Just go to www.regulations.gov and input the Docket Number or RIN (or both, in an abundance of caution). That information is included in my own Comments, below, which I left on Monday, July 8, 2019.

July 8, 2019
BY POSTING TO FEDERAL eRULEMAKING PORTAL
IN WORD AND pdf

Federal eRulemaking Portal: www.regulations.gov.
Regulations Division
Office of General Counsel
Department of Housing and Urban Development
451 7th Street SW, Room 10267
Washington, DC 20410-0500
Re: HUD Docket No. FR-6124-P-01. RIN 2501-AD89.

To the Department of Housing and Urban Development:

These Comments concern changes to Mixed Status Families Rules proposed by HUD. My Comments break down into a number of concrete areas, identified below.

    1. The origin of your proposed Rules changes is irrational. I understand that HUD’s
proposed Mixed Status Families Rules changes were not written or researched by HUD. They were written by a current employee of the White House, Mr. Stephen Miller, who has parenthetically not been appointed to any position in the federal government. Mr. Miller’s proposals were shown to HUD Secretary Benjamin Carson, who I understand did not like them but neither did he oppose them.
    The origin story of these changes exponentially increases the chances that a Court will find the changes irrational. As noted below, there are other reasons that your proposed changes are irrational. My first point is that, whether taken separately or together with the other reasons discussed below, a Court is more likely than not to hold that your proposed changes are irrational and even “contrived,” to borrow a word from Chief Justice Robert’s recent opinion on proposed rules changes to the United States Census.

    2. Millions of dollars will be lost to HUD if your proposed Rules changes are finalized
because undocumented immigrants are among the most reliable tenants HUD has. The current status of the law is that so long as one member of a family is a citizen of the United States, the family is entitled to HUD housing as I understand it. Your proposed Rules changes would stand the law on its head. Mr. Miller’s proposal would be to deny HUD housing to anyone in a family who is not a citizen or is an undocumented immigrant, leaving behind the person(s) in that family who are U.S. citizens, mostly children.
    “The primary cost would be the economic costs of moving.” HUD’s Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) of these proposed rules changes, Docket No. FR-6124-P-01, at 13 (April 15, 2019). HUD’s Regulatory Impact Analysis does not come out and say so, but the moving costs estimated by HUD at between $9,500,000 and $13,000,000 would be borne by the mixed families assuming that they could come up with that amount of money.
    A secondary but inevitable cost would be formal eviction. HUD would bear the costs of formal eviction. HUD estimates its costs for formally evicting families under the proposed Mixed Status Families rules as between $3,300,000 and $4,400,000, or between $3.3 Million and $4.4 Million. RIA, Docket No. FR-6124-P-01, at 4 and 15 (April 15, 2019).
    Any parent knows that most children will follow their evicted parents. As HUD’s own Regulatory Impact Analysis crudely put it, “Most ineligibles live in small households that could not easily separate.” RIA, Docket No. FR-6124-P-01, at 16 (April 15, 2019).
    That means that inevitably HUD will lose these people as tenants. Putting to one side the moral and ethical failures of such changes, the loss of these families as tenants would be an economic catastrophe.
    Undocumented immigrants are among the most reliable tenants that HUD has. They do not want to attract the attention that would come their way if they do not pay their rent on time. It would be irrational to evict them or otherwise force them to move out of the HUD housing on which they currently and faithfully pay rent. Their rent payments total millions of dollars, all of which would be lost to HUD and the federal taxpayer. This result is not rational. The proposed changes under consideration do not serve any other purpose which is itself either rational or desirable.

    3. Replacing these mixed immigration households that would be displaced if the Rules
changes are finalized would cost HUD millions of dollars excluding even lost rental monies. HUD would be required to pay full subsidies for each resident that would be left in a household in subsidized public housing. Under the law, the amount of subsidies is prorated according to the number of undocumented immigrants (no subsidy) vs. the number of legal residents (subsidized). If these proposed changes were made, the costs to HUD would then be in the millions of dollars because HUD would be paying direct subsidies calculated by each individual person that remains in HUD housing. There would be no prorating HUD’s payments then.
    HUD published its own “Summary of Transfers” Table to show the total estimated costs of replacing mixed status families currently receiving HUD housing assistance (subsidies), with households in which every single individual is eligible for HUD housing assistance, at $372 Million “annually” (without saying for how long these “annual” costs would continue) as a “Low Estimate,” and $437 Million “annual” costs as a “High Estimate.” In other words, in just the first year the costs of these proposed Rules changes are estimated by HUD to run between $372 Million and $437 Million. HUD RIA, Docket No. FR-6124-P-01, at 11 (April 15, 2019).
    No telling how many years such “annual” costs or any “annual” costs like them would continue if the proposed Mixed Status Families rules changes are finalized and adopted.
    And for what return on this expense? This too is another reason that the proposed Rules changes are irrational. They are almost certain to be found irrational by a Court as soon as they are challenged in litigation. Knowing that up front, so to speak, what reason can HUD give for pursuing these proposed changes and incurring these certain expenses?
    If there is a good reason, I have not heard it.

Conclusion

The fact that HUD did not write or research the proposed rules changes in question is an untreatable wound to the viability of the Mixed Status Families rules changes. The fact that these proposals were presented to HUD by political employee(s) without HUD’s involvement and without HUD’s intervention, but only with HUD’s acquiescence in their false presentation of “contrived” reasons for their adoption, is fatal to their implementation as law in the United States.
    Further, finalization and adoption of these proposals will result in the loss of millions of dollars of rental payments to HUD with no offsetting benefits whatsoever.
    Finally, additional “annual” costs will accrue to HUD by HUD’s own best estimates over an unstated period of time, if these proposed Rules changes are finalized and adopted, somewhere between $372 Million and $437 Million a year.
    Whether these considerations are taken separately or together, they require HUD to withdraw the proposed Mixed Status Families rules changes or suffer certain judicial rulings striking them down as what they are, “contrived.”
    Instead, HUD itself has proposed alternatives. Some of them are rational. See RIA, Docket No. FR-6124-P-01, at 17, in paragraph titled, “Alternatives” (April 15, 2019). Consider them instead, even as you withdraw the current proposed rules changes.
    Thank you for your consideration.

Download HUD'S MIXED STATUS FAMILIES RULE COMMENTS.07.08.19.

Please Read The Disclaimer. ©2019 Dennis J. Wall. All Rights Reserved.

 

KATE BAILEY, YOU JUST LEARNED A HARSH LESSON: CLIENT CONTROL.

In hindsight, you should have seen it coming.

They left it to Kate Bailey, Trial Attorney in the Civil Division of the current justice department, to represent to the Court in Washington, D.C. that the current federal government had backed down. She represented to the judge in the citizenship case pending in the District that the federal government had abandoned its position in the litigation. From now on, she wrote, the federal government would not seek to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census.

Kate Bailey wrote that down. In a letter to the lawyers in the case. And she represented that to the judge in the case.

And that was the current federal government's new position, that they would no longer defend contest that litigation with its previous position that they wanted to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. That was their new position.

Until it wasn't.

See Noah Bierman and David G. Savage, Citizen Question May Be Back On 2020 Census As Trump Administration Reverses Course Again, Los Angeles Times online Wednesday, July 3, 2019 (the Los Angeles Times may charge for online access).

By tweet, the department of justice pulled the rug out from under Kate Bailey. They shredded her reputation with the Court. They took away her credibility as a lawyer.

They changed their new position, which became their old position, and in their new-new position they told the judge at a telephone hearing the day before the Fourth of July that they 'might' change their position back to their original position. They were "looking into it," they told the judge.

Then they asked for more time until Monday to think it over.

The judge said "no." One word in response to that request: "No."

He set a hearing for today at 2:00 P.M. for the current federal government to make its mind up and, one way or the other, litigate the case or withdraw its defense of the case. Either present a plan to litigate or stipulate that the citizenship question is withdrawn and will not be printed on the 2020 Census forms.

Do you think Kate Bailey will be in attendance at today's hearing?

Don't hold your breath if you don't like the color blue, as the saying goes.

Ms. Bailey, you don't have to work for these people who humiliate you. You can enter private practice. At least then you could file a motion for leave to withdraw. The judge may not let you out of the case, but at least then you would have a chance.

Not like now, when they won't give you a chance. Instead they will pull the rug out from underneath your credibility whenever it suits their purpose. If you did not know beforehand that these are the kind of people you chose to work for, you know now.

Talk about bad faith.

Please Read The Disclaimer. ©2019 Dennis J. Wall. All Rights Reserved.

Download IBF 07.05.19.

Postscript on Saturday, July 6, 2019:

I checked out the case on PACER (Public Access to [Federal] Court Electronic Records) yesterday.  The case is Kravitz v. U.S. Department of Commerce, (D. Md. Case No. 8:18-cv-01041).  Kate Bailey, Esquire is not a counsel of record in that case.  So why was it left to her to make an announcement that the current federal government was no longer defending the case?  The justice department filed a new pleading yesterday with a "Plan A" and a "Plan B."  The government's Plan A was convoluted and it is best if you try to read it for yourself.  The case information for PACER is provided above.  The government's Plan B is that it agreed with the plaintiffs' proposed order for discovery deadlines in the case if the judge was going to proceed.  The judge is going to proceed.  The judge  entered the scheduling order proposed by the plaintiffs  -- and joined as noted by the government -- to set discovery deadlines in the case.

SO THIS IS HOW YOU CELEBRATE THE FOURTH OF JULY.

See Ledyard King, Sarah Elbeshbishi, and Jason Lalljee, What to Expect at the Washington DC 4th of July: Army Tanks, A Burning Flag and Baby Trump, USA TODAY online July 2, 2019 (USA Today may charge for online access).

   Photo - Getty Images.

God Bless Us All!  Happy Fourth of July!  Please Read The Disclaimer. ©2019 Dennis J. Wall.  All Rights Reserved.

DESPITE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER, SEAL SUBJECT TO GOOD CAUSE SHOWING.

In Karrani v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. C18-1510 RSM, 2019 WL 2724046 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 2019), the Court applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court to a motion to seal evidence.  The motion to seal already followed after a designation of the evidence as "confidential" pursuant to a Stipulated Protective Order previously approved by the Court in that case.

Despite that, the Court ruled that Federal Rules and Local Rules trump a Stipulated Protective Order when it comes to sealing evidence in the Court file:

Accordingly, a “good cause” showing under Rule 26(c) may suffice to keep under seal documents attached to non-dispositive motions. Id. Rule 26, which gives district courts flexibility in balancing and protecting the interests of private parties, states that “good cause” is shown where forbidding disclosure or discovery would “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

    The Court’s Local Rules explicitly instruct parties to present legal and evidentiary support in a motion to seal. Normally that motion must include “a specific statement of the applicable legal standard and the reasons for keeping a document under seal, with evidentiary support from declarations where necessary.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 5(g)(3)(B).

Karrani v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. C18-1510 RSM, 2019 WL 2724046, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 2019).

Lesson learned here:  Stipulated Protective Orders are not enough standing alone to provide a basis for sealing evidence in a Federal Court's file.  Federal Rules and Local Rules govern that decision, as in this case, where the Court denied both of the two motions to seal filed by the plaintiff even as the Court directed further compliance with the Stipulated Protective Order that it had previously approved in the case.  Karrani v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. C18-1510 RSM, 2019 WL 2724046, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 2019)

Please Read The Disclaimer.  ©2019 Dennis J. Wall.  All Rights Reserved.